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Macroeconomic  Profitability:  Theory  and  Evidence 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  gives  an  account  of  recent  work  on  the 
measurement,  statistical  analysis,  and  theoretical  analysis  of 
macroeconomic  profitability.  Measurement  issues  include  the 
treatment  of  holding  gains  on  physical  assets  and  net  financial 
liabilities,  national  income  accounting  practices  and  recent 
revisions,  and  the  use  of  accounting  rates  of  return. 
Statistical  work  has  focused  on  the  identification  of  trends  and 
shifts  in  profit  rates  not  caused  by  cyclical  fluctuations,  and 
various  theoretical  explanations  have  been  offered  for  the 
generally  low  rates  of  return  that  appeared  in  the  1970s.  These 
include  capital  deepening  stimulated  by  a  reduction  in  the  cost 
of  capital  funds;  profit  squeezes  caused  by  some  combination  of 
slower  productivity  growth,  real  wage  push,  and  raw  material 
price  inflation;  declining  capital  productivity;  and  changes  in 
effective  tax  rates. 
The  paper  raises  several  questions.  The  use  of  a  constant 
mark-up  pricing  model  in  reduced  form  to  control  for  cyclical 
effects  on  profitability  is  questioned  because  of  evidence  that 
the  mark-up  is  variable,  and  some  suggestions  for  incorporating 
this  evidence  into  applied  studies  of  profitability  are  offerred. 
Several  empirical  puzzles  are  identified.  The  apparent  decline 
in  capital  productivity  is  one;  the  more  pronounced  decline  in 
before-tax  profitability  compared  to  after-tax  profitability  is 
another. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY  87 J&._roduction.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  give  an 
account  of  the  macroeconomics  of  profits:  how  they  are 
determined,  what  is  their  significance,  what  iseknown  about 
their  behavior.  I  have  chosen  to  concentrate  on  applied  studies 
of  macroeconomic  profitability  as  the  vehicle  for  organizing  the 
views  of  a  wide  variety  of  economists.  By  macroeconomic 
profitability  I  mean  the  rate  of  return  on  physical  capital,  the 
object  of  analysis  in  the  familiar  macroeconomic  growth  model  of 
your  choice. 
Three  competing  paradigms  are  represented  in  this  survey: 
neoclassical,  neo-Keynesian,  and  neo-Marxian  economic  theories. 
Rather  than  direct  a  frontal  assault  on  the  differences,  I 
contrast  the  alternative  interpretations  of  declining 
profitability  in  the  1970s  offered  by  representatives  of  each 
school  of  thought.' 
Recent  efforts  to  understand  the  macroeconomics  of 
profitability  have  revolved  around  three  moments:  the  measurement 
of  profitability,  the  identification  of  secular  and  cyclical 
movements  in  profitability,  and  the  theoretical  explanation  of 
those  movements.  The  paper's  organization  aligns  with  this 
natural  structure.  Tables  and  figures  appear  after  the  endnotes. 
1 The  Measurement  of  Profits  and  Profitability 
"Perhaps  no  term  or  concept  in  economic  discussion  is 
used  with  a more  bewildering  variety  of  well 
established  meanings  than  profit." 
In a  noninflationary 
Frank  Knight  (1934,  p,  480). 
world  of  family  firms  using  one-period 
capital  inputs  with  no  taxes  or  debt,  measuring  profit  would  be 
a  relatively  straightforward  matter  of  deducting  expenses  from 
receipts.  The  accountant's  books  and  the  economist's  books  would 
coincide.  But  in  the  presence  of  long-lived  assets  of  various 
maturities,  price  changes,  debt  financing,  and  taxation,  the  two 
bookkeeping  systems  diverge  and  researchers  face  some  difficult 
questions.  Should  profit-type  income  include  net  interest 
payments?  How  should  holding  gains  on  real  assets  or  on  net 
financial  liabilities  be  treated?  Should  profitability  be 
measured  on  gross  capital  stock  (including  depreciation  in  the 
numerator)  or  net  stock  (excluding  depreciation),  and  indeed  are 
average  accounting  rates  of  profit  meaningful  at  all? 
This  section  reviews  the  major  measurement  issues  raised  in 
applied  studies  of  macroeconomic  profitability,  which  excludes 
the  narrower  issue  of  returns  on  equity.  Unless  otherwise 
stated,  the  discussion  is  confined  to  nonfinancial  corporations 
which  account  for  about  65  to  70  per  cent  of  total  business  gross 
domestic  product  in  the  U.S.  The  nonfinancial  corporate  sector 
is  the  universe  of  observation  most  often  used  in  the  studies  of 
profitability  reviewed  in  the  next  section.  Since  these  studies 
were  done,  some  revisions  have  been  made  in  the  national  income 
2 accounts  and  these  need  to  be  carefully  examined. 
Concepts  of  capital  income.  Corporate  earnings  fall  into 
two  broad  categories:  operating  surplus  and  holding  gains.  These 
two  categories  are  conflated  in  financial  and  tax  accounts  by  the 
use  of  historical  cost  accounting  for  inventories  in  both 
accounts.  National  income  accounts  are  based  on  the  concept  of 
, 
income  originating  in  current  production,  and  thus  are  faced  with 
the  task  of  removing  holding  gains  from  reported  profits,  but 
other  concepts  of  income  have  been  proposed  that  lead  to 
alternative  practices. 
Haig-Simons  comprehensive  income  (Simons  1938),  for 
instance,  defines  corporate  profits  as  disbursements  to 
stockholders  plus  change  in net  worth,  This  concept,  which 
incorporates  both  realized  and  accrued  real  holding  gains  on  both 
physical  assets  and  net  financial  liabilities  as  income,  has  been 
proposed  primarily  for  financial  and  tax  accounting;  see  Shoven 
and  Bulow  (1975,  1976).  Including  holding  gains  in  profits  is 
clearly  justified  in  studies  of  returns  to  stockholder  equity. 
In  studies  of  macroeconomic  profitability,  however,  the 
appropriate  treatment  of  holding  gains  is  less  clear  and  will  be 
discussed  in  greater  detail  below. 
Most  research  is  guided  by  Pigou-Marshall  capital 
maintenance  income  (Pigou  1941),  which  deducts  from  gross  income 
those  expenses  necessary  to maintain  physical  capital  intact. 
Only  realized  (not  accrued)  holding  gains  count  as  income  by  this 
concept,  and  in  practice  only  holding  gains  on  net  financial 
3 liabilities  are  typically  recognized.*  As  in  financial 
accounting,  the  firm  is  a  "going  concern"  that  does  not  stake  out 
new  positions  in  response  to  changes  in  asset  values.  For 
example,  iP  its  inventories  of  working  capi-tal rise  in  relative 
value  the  firm  does  not  benefit  from  these  accrued  holding  gains 
since  they  are  absorbed  by  the  higher  price  the  firm  must  now  pay 
for  working  capital.  In  eliminating  holding  gains  on  inventories 
by  applying  last-in  first-out  (LIFO)  accounting  universally, 
national  income  accounts  align  closely  with  capital  maintenance 
income,  but  in  ignoring  the  effects  of  inflation  on  net  financial 
liabilities  they  diverge  from  it.  The  studies  we  survey  overcome 
this  divergence  by  defining  capital  income  to  include  ne-t 
interest  payments. 
The  central  difference  between  Haig-Simons  and  Pigou- 
Marshall  income  is  that  the  former  conceives  the  firm  as  a 
portfolio  manager  which  takes  new  positions  in  response  to 
changes  in  asset  and  product  prices,  while  the  latter  conceives 
the  firm  as  a producing  agent  which  reproduces  its  ability  to 
continue  production  over  time. 
Operating  surplus.  I adopt  the  neutral  term  "operating 
surpluslt  out  of  respect  for  the  heterogenous  nature  of  capital 
income.  With  the  exception  of  this  term,  I adopt  the  terminology 
of  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis's  National  Income  and 
Product  Accounts  (NIPA).  Operating  surplus  is  value  added  minus 
compensation,  indirect  taxes  net  of  subsidies,  and  depreciation 
at  current  costs.  From  the  view  of  economic  theory,  operating 
4 surplus  combines  several  disparate  kinds  of  income:  normal 
profits,  monopoly  profits,  rents  on  new  technologies,  risk 
premia,  and  net  interest  payments.  Ruggles  and  Ruggles  suggest 
some  heroic  procedures  for  separating  the  normal  profit  element, 
which  they  estimate  to  be  about  half  NIPA  profits  in  1966  (1970, 
P*  108).  Opinions  on  the  true  value  of  the  proportion  of  above- 
, 
normal  profits  range  from  zero  (product  and  factor  markets 
perfectly  competitive)  to  nonnegligible.  Hall  (1986)  finds 
evidence  that  firms  earn  returns  above  the  Hall-Jorgenson  rental 
cost  of  capital. 
It  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  gross  and  net  operating 
surplus,  GOS  and  NOS.  The  use  of  historical  cost  accounting  and 
the  liberal  provisions  for  depreciation  permitted  by  tax  codes 
require  an  inventory  valuation  adjustment  (IVA)  and  a  capital 
consumption  adjustment  (CCAdj),  so  that  these  operating  surpluses 
are  described  by 
GOS  = PAT  t  T  t  CCA  t  IVA  t  R 
(1) 
NOS  = PAT  t  T  t  CCAdj  t  IVA  t  R 
In  these  identities,  PAT  represents  reported  profits  after  tax,  T 
represents  corporate  income  tax,  CCA  represents  reported  capital 
consumption  allowances,  and  R  represents  net  interest  paid. 
Measurement  of  these  items  in  the  U.S.  NIPAs  is  discussed  in 
order  from  left  to  right. 
The.procedures  for  assembling  the  data  on  PAT  and  T are 
detailed  with  some  precision  in  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce, 
I3urcau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1985A).  Briefly,  profits  before  tax 
5 (PBT),  T,  and  PAT  are  derived  from  Internal  Revenue  Service 
records.  Revisions  are  made  in  July  when  IRS  data  become 
available  for  annual  data  three  years  past.  Annual  and  quarterly 
profits  for  the  intervening  intervals  are  based  on  extrapolations 
and  interpolations  from  secondary  sources,  such  as  the  Bureau  of 
Census's  Quarterly  Financial  Report.3  As  IRS  records  become 
, 
available  the  recent  profit  data  are  subject  to  revision.  Since 
tax  data  are  also  necessary  for  the  estimation  of  the  capital 
consumption  adjustments,  the  estimates  of  economic  profits  are 
subject  to  revisions  too.  In  July  1986  the  following  revisions 
were  released  for  nonfinancial  corporations: 
Profits  Profits 
with  IVA  and  Before  Tax 
CCAdj 
Billions  of  dollars 
CCAdj 
New  Old  New  Old  New  Old 
1983  165.5  160.6  159.3  151.5  17.1  19.0 
1984  216.7  221.1  189.3  186.3  32.9  40.3 
1985  224.2  240.7  170.3  172.3  54.5  69.0 
----------_____ 
SOURCE:  NIPA  Table  1.16,  Survey  of  Current  Business,  March  and 
July,  1986. 
Most  of  the  change  in  economic  profits  originated  in  the 
reductions  in  CCAdj  when  new  IRS  data  on  the  coverage  of 
Accelerated  Cost  Recovery  System  depreciation  became  available 
(Survey  of  Current  Business,  July  1986,  pp.  19-20).  Later  I 
discuss  the  advisability  of  using  gross  profitability,  which  does 
not  depend  on  accurate  estimates  of  economic  depreciation. 
Research  and  development  expenditures  are  treated  as  a  cost 
in  the  NIPAs.  Rugglcs  and  Ruggles  (1970,  p,  108)  observe  that 
6 R&D  is  more  akin  to  investment;  treating  it  as  a  cost  understates 
corporate  profits.  Another  cost  one  is  inclined  to  question  is 
executive  salaries.  Does  anyone  really  believe  Victor  Posner's 
marginal  product  is  over  eight  million  dollars? 
Ruggles  and  Ruggles  (1982)  develop  a  system  of  integrated 
economic  accounts  differing  from  the  existing  NIPAs  in  a 
of  respects.  Since  they  neither  detail  their  procedures 
publish  data  (although  it  is  available  on  magnetic  tape) 
number 
nor 
for  the 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector,  an  evaluation  of  the  effects  of 
their  accounting  system  on  nonfinancial  corporate  operating 
surplus  remains  an  interesting  project.  However,  their 
accounting  system  for  allocating  saving  between  the  enterprise 
sector  (private  domestic  industry  and  government  enterprise  minus 
owner-occupied  housing)  and  the  household  sector  sheds  light  on  a 
time-honored  debate  between  neo-Keynesian/neo-Marxian  and 
neoclassical  economists  about  the  role  of  profit-type  income  in 
generating  saving  for  business  capital  accumulation.  For  an 
overview  of  this  debate,  consult  Marglin  (1984A).  Briefly,  neo- 
.  Keynesian/neo-Marxian  economists  argue  that  business  saving 
finances  a  sufficiently  large  proportion  of  business  investment 
to  justify  theoretical  models  which  suppress  the  role  of  saving 
out  of  wages. 
By  virtue  of  accounting  practices  that  depart  from  NIPA 
procedures,  e.g.  allocating  pension  fund  contributions  to  the 
gross  saving  of  the  enterprise  sector  (the  sector  that  actually 
does  the  saving)  rather  than  to  the  household  sector  (as  the 
7 NIPAs  do),  Ruggles  and  Ruggles  find  that  from  1947  to  1980,  "the 
enterprise  sector's  gross  saving  was  95  percent  of  its  gross 
capital  formation"  (Ruggles  and  Ruggles  1982,  p.  50),  a  picture 
that  conforms  closely  to  the  neo-Kcynesian/neo-Marxian  theory. 
Capital  consumption  adjustments.  The  CCAdj  corrects 
reported  depreciation  charges  from  tax  accounts.  Economic 
depreciation  is  calculated  at  current  replacement  cost  us:ng 
straight-line  depreciation  and  retirements  following  a  modified 
Winfrey  S-3  distribution  centered  on  realistic  service  lives. 
Actually  there  are  two  separate,  opposing  adjustments:  CCAdj  for 
consistent  accounting  at  historical  prices,  and  CCAdj  for  current 
replacement  cost.  The  first  takes  account  of  tax  code 
depreciation  provisions,  which  have  become  progressively  more 
liberal.4  The  second  corrects  for  historical  cost  accounting. 
Under  inflation,  historical  cost  accounting  understates  economic 
depreciation  and  overstates  profits.  Tax-based  depreciation 
understates  economic  profits.  The  net  effect  on  economic  profits 
of  these  opposing  adjustments  has  varied  from  positive  to 
negative  in  different  periods.  The  most  spectacular  adjustments 
occur  in  the  1980s  when  owing  to  the  effects  of  liberalized 
depreciation  schedules,  as  much  as  one  fourth  of  after-tax 
economic  profits  are  capital  consumption  adjustments. 
Recent  revisions  in  the  NIPA  capital  stock  model  which  forms 
the  basis  for  the  CCAdj  have  lengthened  the  average  service  lives 
of  most  durable  equipment  to  conform  with  studies  done  by  the 
Treasury  Department  (Gorman  et  al.,  1985).  Previously,  service 
8 lives  were  taken  to  be  . 85  of  the  Bulletin  F  service  lives 
originally  compiled  by  the  Treasury  in  1942.  Longer  service 
lives  generally  reduce  economic  depreciation,  and  increase  the 
CCAdj.  Since  macroeconomic  profitability  is  usually  measured  as 
a  ratio  of  net  operating  surplus  to  net  capital  stock  this  one 
revision  has  a  dual  effect.  Tables  1 and  2 show  recent  revisions 
in  the  NIPAs  for  the  corporate  (including  financial)  sector.  The 
net  capital  stock  has  grown  more  rapidly  than  previously 
estimated  as  seen  by  the  rising  values  along  the  rows  of  Table  2. 
Inventory  valuation  ad,justments.  The  IVA  removes  holding 
gains  on  inventories  from  profits  by  placing  inventories  on  a 
LIFO  basis.5  Under  LIFO,  withdrawals  from' inventories  are  valued 
at  the  price  last  paid  for  inventoried  items.  Unless  firms  are 
closing  out  a  line  of  business  by  selling  inventories  of  finished 
goods,  there  are  no  holding  gains.  The  U.S.  is  unique  among 
industrial  countries  in  permitting  firms  the  choice  of  LIFO  and 
several  historical-cost  accounting  systems  on  condition  that  the 
same  system  is  used  in  tax  and  financial  books.  Since  historical 
cost  systems  such  as  first-in  first-out  (FIFO)  inflate  profits 
during  inflations,  they  can  liven  up  a  stockholders'  report,  but 
LIFO  clearly  lightens  the  tax  burden. 
It  is  a continuing  puzzle  that  most  firms  prefer  non-LIFO 
methods.  In  1982,  only  37  per  cent  of  manufacturing  firms 
reported  using  LIFO  in  the  Census  of  Manufactures  (U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census  1986,  Table  2-3~). 
Applying  the  average  effective  tax  rate  on  operating  surplus  of 
9 41  per  cent  (Holland  1984,  Table  1-6)  in  1981  to  the  IVA  for 
nonfinancial  corporations  of  -$24.2  billion,  firms  paid  an  excess 
tax  on  FIFO-type  profits  of  about  $10  billion.  Why  almost 
two-thirds  of  the  firms  would  make  such  a  gift  to  the  U.S. 
Treasury  is  a mystery.  Two  hypotheses  are  that  managers  fear  the 
stockholders'  response  to  lower  reported  profits  upon  switching 
to  LIFO  and  that  managers'  bonuses  are  tied  to  reported  profits 
(Bulow  and  Shoven,  1982). 
Holding  Pains.  The  IVA  effectively  excludes  holding  gains 
on  inventories  from  capital  income,  but  studies  of  macroeconomic 
profitability  have  not  uniformly  accepted  this  treatment  of 
holding  gains.  Shoven  and  Bulow  (1975,1976)  propose  adoption  of 
Haig-Simons  income  through  what  they  call  purchasing  power 
accrual  accounting;  real  capital  gains,  realized  and  accrued,  on 
both  net  financial  liabilities  and  physical  assets  count 
profit.6  They  also  report  a  parallel  set  of  books  based 
capital  maintenance  income,  which  includes  holding  gains 
financial  liabilities.  To  convey  an  appreciation  of  the 
of  magnitude  involved,  the  three  measures  of  before-tax 
as 
on 
on  net 
orders 
nonfinancial  corporate  profits  for  1974  are  displayed  below  (in 
billions  of  dollars): 
NIPA  Profits  with  Purchasing 
IVA  and  CCAdj  Capital  Maintenance  Power  Accrual 
60.2  89.9  169.3 
--------_------- 
SOURCE:  Bulow  and  Shoven  (1982,  Table  11.2). 
How  should  studies  of  macroeconomic  profitability  treat 
holding  gains?  I take  up  each  type  of  gain  as  they  affect  the 
10 measures  above  From  left  to  right. 
Capital  maintenance  income  includes  holding  gains  from  the 
effects  of  inflation  on  net  financial  liabilities,  Because 
corporations  are  net  debtors,  inflation  erodes  the  value  of  their 
liabilities,  transferring  income  from  the  corporation's 
creditors.  The  principle  that  holding  gains  on  net  liabilities 
redistribute  capital  income  rather  than  change'the  amount  of 
capital  income  produced  justifies  the  use  of  net  operating 
surplus  (i.e.  including  net 
in  studies  of  macroeconomic 
Consider  the  effects  of 
interest  payments  in  capital  income) 
profitability. 
inflation  on  the  balance  sheets  and 
income  statements  of  the  corporate  sector  *and its  creditors, 
assuming  corporations  have  a  long-term  bond  outstanding  with  a 
par  value  of  $1000,  and  that  their  operating  surplus  is  divided 
between  $200  retained  earnings  and  a  $100  coupon  on  the  bond.  If 
inflation  should  rise  from  zero  to  five  per  cent,  the  capital 
accounts  would  record  a  $50  holding  gain  for  corporations  and 
equivalent  loss  for  their  creditors.  Thus,  under  capital 
maintenance  income,  corporations  would  experience  income  of  $200 
plus  the  $50  holding  gain,  while  creditors  would  experience 
income  of  $100  minus  the  $50  loss.  The  operating  surplus  would 
be  unchanged;  $250  plus  $50  equals  $300  as  before. 
Most  researchers  have  accepted  the  NIPA  practice  of 
including  imputed  interest  received  in  measuring  net  interest 
paid.  Imputed  interest  overcomes  the  following  problem  that 
financial  intermediaries  cause  in  national  accounts;  see  Ruggles 
11 and  Ruggles  (1956,  pp.  60-64)  for  a  full  explanation.  An 
established  accounting  practice  for  value  added  in  an  industry  is 
to  add  up  the  income  originating  in  that  industry:  compensation, 
dividends  paid,  retained  earnings,  plus  net  interest  paid.  Banks 
receive  substantially  more  interest  than  they  pay  (otherwise  they 
would  fold),  so  to  avoid  negative  value  added  in  the  banking 
I 
industries,  national  income  accountants  impute  interest  payments. 
Depositors  of  the  banks  receive  imputed  interest,  which  returns 
in  toto  to  the  banks  as  a payment  for  banking  services.  This 
fictitious  transaction  reduced  the  gross  domestic  product 
originating  in  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  by  about  24 
billion  dollars  in  1985.  Since  imputed  interest  represents  an  ex 
post  adjustment  not  reflected  in  any  actual  cash  transaction,  I 
calculate  operating  surpluses  and  rates  of  return  below  entirely 
on  the  basis  of  monetary  interest.  7 The  procedures  change  the 
levels  of  the  rate  of  profit  but  not  its  trends. 
Shoven  and  Bulow's  purchasing  power  accrual  income  also 
includes  real  accrued  holding  gains  on  physical  assets. 
Researchers  have  not  achieved  a  clear  consensus  on  the  treatment 
of  such  gains;  consult  Holland  and  Myers  (1979,  1984)  or  the 
separate  studies  of  profitability  in nine  countries  in  Holland 
(1984)  for  examples  of  the  variety  of  ways  the  issue  is  handled. 
I have  found  no  instance  in which  a  substantive  conclusion  about 
movements  in  profitability  has  been  said  to  hang  on  this  issue. 
Because  holding  gains  can  only  redistribute  wealth  among 
accounting  units  in  society  without  creating  any  new  wealth,  it 
12 can  be  argued  that  they  should  be  excluded  from  capital  income  in 
studies  of  macroeconomic  profitability,  but  see  Eisner  (1980)  for 
an  opposing  viewpoint. 
In  measuring  profitability  below,  I adopt  a  capital 
maintenance  concept  of  income,  and  measure  profitability  on 
reproducible  physical  assets  and  monetary  assets.  _  In  the 
tradition  of  Ricardo,  Marx,  Von  Neumann,  and  Sraffa,  the 
capitalist  economy  is  conceived  as  a  system  in  which  commodities 
are  produced  by  means  of  commodities;  it  is  a  self-reproducing 
system.  The  rate  of  profit  measures  the  ability  of  the  system 
to  produce  an  economic  surplus  relative  to  its  own-input 
requirements  and  in  some  models,  notably  Von  Neumann's  growth 
model,  the  rate  of  profit  represents  the  maximum  rate  of 
expansion  of  the  system.  .From  this  theoretical  perspective, 
with  its  emphasis  on  profitability  as  a  determinant  of  capital 
accumulation,  nonreproducible  inputs  like  land  are  not  relevant 
to  macroeconomic  profitability  however  important  they  may  be  to 
individual  units  of  capital.  Moreover,  as  capital  must  adopt  a 
succession  of  forms,  from  money  capital  to  commodity  inputs  to 
commodity  outputs,  it  is  necessary  at  any  given  point  in  time  to 
include  these  diverse  forms  by  incorporating  inventories,  fixed 
capital,  and  monetary  assets  in  measures  of  profitability  (see 
Foley  1986A).  Finally,  the  realized  holding  gains  on  net 
financial  liabilities  associated  with  inflation  need  to  be 
recognized  as  capital  income  at  the  macroeconomic  level  for 
reasons  explained  above,  and  this  is  accomplished  by  using 
13 operating  surplus  as  suggested  by  the  Pigou-Marshall  concept  of 
income. 
Accounting  rates  of  return.  It  is  clear  that  the  internal 
rate  of  return  of  the  investment  projects  in  operation 
constitutes  the  appropriate  measure  of  macroeconomic 
profitability.  However,  this  is  rarely  known  ex  post,  and  _ 
. 
researchers  have  to  settle  for  an  accounting  rate  of  return  equal 
to  current  accounting  income  (defined  in  various  ways  as  will  be 
seen)  divided  by  capital  stock  estimated  using  an  accounting 
system  that  does  not  accurately  reflect  economic  depreciation. 
Accounting  rates  and  internal  rates  only  correspond  under 
restrictive  conditions.  The  net  accounting  rate  equals  net 
operating  surplus  divided  by  net  capital  stock;  for  the  gross 
accounting  rate,  substitute  the  word  gross  into  the  foregoing. 
Feldstein  and  Summers  (1977)  show  that  if  gross  profits  on 
capital  stock  decay  at  a  constant  exponential  rate,  then  the  net 
accounting  rate  of  return  will  exactly  coincide  with  the  internal 
rate  of  return  if  net  capital  stock  is  calculated  by  a  perpetual 
inventory  method  that  deducts  depreciation  expense  at  that  rate 
of  decay  and  adds  investment  continuously.  If  the  capital  stock 
decays  like  a  light  bulb,  instantaneously  at  the  end  of  its 
service  life  (sometimes  called  the  "one  hoss  shay"  case),  then 
gross  accounting  rates  of  return  and  the  internal  rate  will 
coincide  for  long-lived  assets.  The  gross  capital  stock  is 
calculated  using  a  perpetual  inventory  method  that  deducts  items 
at  the  end  of  their  service  lives.  In  either  case  it  is  possible 
14 to  calculate  the  internal  rate  from  an  accounting  rate  by  using  a 
rate  of  depreciation  that  corresponds  to  economic  depreciation. 
The  difficulty  is  that  depreciation  is  typically  calculated 
on  a  straight-line  basis  in  national  income  accounts,  even  when 
this  may  not  correspond  to  the  actual  pattern  of  economic 
depreciation.s  Under  this  system,  the  gross  accounting  rate  may 
actually  be  superior  to  the  net  accounting  rate'as  an 
approximation  of  the  internal  rate  according  to  the  following 
argument  of  Hill  (1979,  Ch.  3).  Consider  first  a  balanced  set  of 
projects,  for  which  new  entries  equal  discards;  this  assumes  zero 
growth  of  capital,  and  an  equal  number  of  projects  of  every  age. 
In  the  one  hoss  shay  example,  the  gross  rate  of  return  on  a 
balanced  set  of  projects  approaches  the  internal  rate  as  the 
service  life  of  the  representative  project  increases,  but  the  net 
rate  approaches  a value  twice  the  internal  rate,  illustrating 
again  that  the  gross  rate  can  give  a  better  approximation  of  the 
internal  rate  when  depreciation  actually  occurs  through  the 
discarding  of  burnt  out  "light  bulbs." 
Under  more  realistic  conditions,  it  becomes  difficult  to  say 
much  about  the  relationship  between  accounting  and  internal  rates 
of  return.  If  the  stream  of  gross  profits  is  declining,  due  to 
the  effects  of  physical  wear  and  tear  on  machinery  or  to  the 
effects  of  technological  obsolescence,  the  effect  of  stacking 
returns  closer  to  the  beginning  of  a  project  will  tend  to  raise 
the  internal  rate.  If  we  assume  that  the  sum  of  the  gross 
profits  remains  fixed,  but  that  they  are  concentrated  in  the 
15 early  years  of  the  project,  then  neither  the  gross  nor  the  net 
'rate  will  be  affected  but  the  internal  rate  will  be  raised,  and 
it  is  impossible  to  say  which  accounting  rate  will  lie  closer  to 
the  internal  rate.  The  conclusion  Hill  draws  from  all  this  is 
simply  that  "there  is  no  justification  for  ignoring  the  valuable 
information  provided  by  the  average  gross  rate"(p.  66). 
The  fact  that  in  practice  neither  Hill  nor  Feldstein  and 
Summers  nor  I  (in  Figure  1 below)  find  very  large  differences 
between  gross  and  net  accounting  rates  would  seem  to  strengthen 
this  conclusion,  whose  practical  importance  lies  in  doing  away 
with  the  need  to  calculate  economic  depreciation  to  estimate  the 
rate  of  return.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  Figure  1 the 
gross  rate  has  declined  more  slowly  than  the  net  rate.  Could 
this  fact  be  consistent  with  Hill's  finding  that  under  the 
conditions  described  above  (no  growth,  a  balanced  set  of 
projects,  and  declining  gross  profits),  the  gross  rate  is  a 
decreasing  function  of  service  life  while  the  net  rate  is an 
increasing  function?  In  the  U.S.,  a  secular  shift  from 
investment  in  structures  to  investment  in  equipment  has  probably 
reduced  the  service  life  of  the  representative  project  in  the 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector. 
The  similarity  between  gross  and  net  accounting  rates  of 
return  does  not  validate  the  use  of  either,  however,  as  the 
following  quotations  (which  refer  specifically  to  the  net 
accounting  rate)  from  prominent  sources  in  the  literature  make 
clear: 
16 .  .  .  as  an  indication  of  the  realized  rate  of  return  the 
accountant's  rate  of  profit  is  greatly  influenced  by 
irrelevant  factors,  even  under  ideal  conditions."  (Harcourt 
1965,  p.  80)  [note:  Harcourt  assumes  a  Golden  Age  in  which 
the  realized  rate  of  return  is  equal  to  the  internal  rate  of 
return.] 
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.  .  .  accounting  rates  of  return,  even  if  properly  and 
consistently  measured,  provide  almost  no  information  about 
economic  rates  of  return."  (Fisher  and  McGowen  1983,  p.  82) 
Much  of  this  literature  focuses  on'comparisons  across  firms 
, 
and  industries  rather  than  across  time  for  broad  macroeconomic 
aggregates.  Fisher  and  McGowen's  argument,  for  instance,  was 
used  to  defend  IBM's  rather  high  accounting  rate  of  return  in 
anti-trust  litigation.g  It  is  clear  from  this  literature  that 
differences  in  service  lives,  in  time  profiles  of  returns,  or  in 
growth  rates  all  create  rather-arbitrary  divergences  between  net 
accounting  rates  and  internal  rates  of  return.lO  It  is  somewhat 
unsettling  that  these,conditions  are  all  likely  to  be  changing 
over  the  long  stretches  of  historical  time  typically  examined  in 
studies  of  macroeconomic  profitability,  suggesting  the  need  for 
further  research  into  the  practical  importance  of  the  objections 
voiced  above. 
17 Studies  of  Macroeconomic  Profitability 
"One  of  my  gripes  is  that  everybody  in  this  business  rolls 
their  own  cyclical  adjustment  method  with  every  paper.  I 
wish  we  could  somehow  standardize  on  one  and  use  it 
consistently." 
Robert  Solow  in  Bosworth  (1982,  p.  319) 
Long-run  growth  models  make  predictions  about  movements  in 
the  share  and  rate  of  profit  over  historical  time,  but  * 
profitability  may  mirror  cyclical  factors  having  only  a  remote 
relationship  to  long-run  forces.  Short-run  reductions  in  output, 
for  example,  raise  unit  costs  because  overhead  expenses 
(including  overhead  labor  costs)  are  spread  over  fewer  units.  If 
firms  do  not  raise  their  mark-up  sufficiently  (and  evidence 
suggests  they  do  not),  profits  will  be  squeezed  and  unsqueezed 
through  the  normal  operation  of  the  business  cycle.  There  may, 
of  course,  be  more  complex  relationships  involving  profits  in  the 
cycle,  but  the  tendency  for  unit  costs  to  move  anti-cyclically  is 
among  the  most  universally  agreed  upon.  An  established  method 
for  separating  cyclical  and  secular  movements  in  profitability 
uses  regression  analysis  to  estimate  the  rate  of  return  that 
would  exist  at  normal  levels  of  capacity  utilization.ll 
Cyclical  adjustment.  The  major  studies  of  profitability  in 
the  U.S.12  and  other  industrial  countries  using  regression 
analysis  are  arranged  in  Tables  3  and  5.  Both  of  these  tables 
report  a  representative  finding  about  the  nature  of  historical 
movements  in  profitability  but  do  not  necessarily  convey  the  full 
breadth  of  authors'  findings  which  are  often  contained  in  a 
18 battery  of  regression  results.  The  second  and  third  columns  show 
the  coverage  of  the  study.  Most  researchers  in  the  U.S.  have 
chosen  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector,  while  most  of  the 
studies  of  other  industrial  countries  focus  on  manufacturing. 
The  fourth  column  describes  the  measure  of  profitability.  The 
distinction  between  before  and  after-tax  profitability  turns  out 
to  be  one  that  matters  substantively.  The  remaining  columns  are 
explained  below. 
My  purpose  is  to  lay  before  the  reader  the  full  array  of 
methods,  choices  of  data,  and  principal  results  about  the  pattern 
of  historical  movements  in profitability,  beginning  with  the 
methodology  of  cyclically  adjusting  profitability. 
The  hypothesis  of  mark-up  pricing  over  standard  or  normal 
unit  costs  underlies  the  cyclical  adjustment  of  profitability. 
Simply  put,  firms  set  prices  by  marking  up  their  normal  unit 
costs.  Normal  costs  are  tied  to  a normal  or  trend  level  of 
output  rather  than  the  actual  level,  which  fluctuates  over  the 
business  cycle.  Mark-up  pricing  is  fundamentally  an  hypothesis 
about  how  prices  change  in  response  to  changes  in  costs  rather 
than  a  complete  theory  of  prices.  This  hypothesis  has  a  long 
and  venerable  history,  and  several  versions  of  it  exist.13 
In  the  strictest  version,  the  mark-up  is  fixed  by  long-run 
considerations,  and  is  insensitive  to  product  or  labor  demand. 
Such  absolute  price  stickiness  remains  among  the  more 
controversial  issues  in  economics.14  Disagreement  about  how 
inclusive  to  make  normal  unit  costs  also  defines  different 
19 schools  of  thought,  but  it  has  not  had  a  major  impact  on  the 
profitability  literature.  One  exception  is  Nordhaus,  who 
experiments  with  a  variety  of  mark-up  models.  Of  six 
alternatives  on  a  spectrum  from  least  to  most  inclusive  of 
different  costs,  Nordhaus  finds  the  simplest  model  (mark-up  over 
normal  unit  labor  costs,  including  salaried  labor)  tracks  the 
data  best  (1974,  p.  188-90). 
. 
For  ease  of  exposition,  consider  an  economy  having  only 
labor  costs,  assuming  intermediate  goods  wash  out  at  the 
aggregate  level.  The  mark-up  pricing  equation  is: 
(21  P  =  (1  +  m)  w  (Ln/Xn) 
where  m  represents  the  mark-up,  p  and  w  represent  price  and 
money  wage,  L  and  X  are  labor  and  output  per  period,  and  a 
subscript  n  indicates  the  normal  level  of  a  variable. 
The  share  of  net  operating  surplus  fluctuates  with  the  level 
of  effective  demand  to  the  extent  that  actual  unit  costs  deviate 
from  their  normal  values  over  the  business  cycle.  One  of  the 
best  established  facts  about  costs  is  the  existence  of  short-run 
increasing  returns  to  labor.15  Increased  employment  typically 
decreases  unit  labor  requirements,  so  we  can  write: 
(3)  L  =a0  t  ai  (X/X,)  ai  >  0 
The  operating  surplus  is  simply  the  residual  remaining  out  of 
receipts  after  labor  costs,  pX  -  wL.  Substituting  equations  2 
and  3  into  this  equation  we  obtain  the  following  expression: 
(4)  NOS=-wao  t  wl(l+mlLn  -  ail(X/X,) 
The  rate  of  return  is  simply  the  ratio  of  operating  surplus 
20 to  the  aggregate  capital  stock  at  current  prices,  pK,  and  can  be 
written,  after  some  manipulation,  as: 
(5)  r  =  bo  +  bl  (X/X,)  bl  > 0 
where  bo  and  bl  group  terms  for  simplicity.16  This  equation  for 
the  cyclical  behavior  of  the  rate  of  profit  is  essentially  the 
mark-up  pricing  equation  in  reduced  form. 
Corresponding  to  equations  4 and  5 are  techniques  for 
cyclically  adjusting  profits  in  order  to  identify  trends  and 
shifts.  Corresponding  to  equation  4  is  what  I will  call  the 
mark-up  pricing  method  which  reconstructs  the  time  series  for 
normal  costs  and  plugs  these  into  equation  2  to  predict  prices  or 
equation  4  to  predict  profits.  Comparing 
actual  values  of  prices  or  profits  is  the 
mark-up  pricing  method.  Obviously  actual 
complex  (for  example,  fixed  capital,  from 
the  predicted  to  the 
modus  operandi  of  the 
mark-up  models  are  more 
which  I abstract,  plays 
an  important  role  in  changes  in  average  total  cost  over  the 
cycle)  but  this  exposition  does  convey  the  flavor  of  what  they 
do. 
Corresponding  to  equation  5  is  the  method  of  regression 
analysis  used  by  most  researchers  in  the  field.  Unlike  the  mark- 
up  pricing  method  in which  a  constant  mark-up  is  imposed  on  the 
data,  the  regression  approach  permits  researchers  to  relax  the 
constant  mark-up  assumption  over  historical  time.  By  plugging  in 
normal  or  full  capacity  levels  of  the  variables  in  their 
estimated  regression  equation,  or  by  correcting  the  raw  data  for 
capacity  utilization  by  using  the  estimate  of  its  effect  from 
21 equation  5,  they  generate  cyclically  adjusted  time  series  of  the 
rate  of  profit. 
As  column  five  of  Table  3 makes  clear,  researchers  have 
cautiously  tried  a variety  of  instruments  to  control  for  the 
cycle,  ranging  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  capacity 
utilization  index  for  manufacturing,  to  estimates  of  the  gap 
between  actual  and  potential  GNP.  As  it  is  customary  for- 
researchers  to  report  their  results  over  a  range  of  such 
instruments,  since  no  single  measure  of  capacity  utilization  is 
perfectly  suited  to  the  task  at  hand,  it  is  possible  to  state 
that  the  choice  of  cyclical  control  has  not  been  argued  to  affect 
substantive  conclusions  about  the  statistical  significance  of 
trends  in  profitability  in  the  studies  surveyed  here.  Some  of 
the  studies  go  beyond  mere  cyclical  control  by  including 
additional  explanatory  variables  like  the  inflation  rate  in  the 
plain-vanilla  regression  equation. 
The  real  differences  lie  in  the  specification  of  the  pa-ttern 
of  trends.  Three  methods  of  trend  analysis  are  used,  which  I 
call  simple  trend,  trend/shift,  and  trends-with-bends.  The 
following  equations  are  representative  of  these  three  methods: 
r  = bo  t bl  CU  t bz  t  Simple  trend 
(6)  r  q  bo  t bl  CU  t b2  t  t b3  D(YEARS)  Trend/shift 
r  = bo  t bl  CU  t bz  t  t b3  D(YEARS)t'  Trends  w/  bends 
In  these  equations,  CU  represents  some  measure  of  capacity 
utilization,  t a  time  trend,  D(YEARS)  a dummy  variable  equal  to 
unity  over  some  time  segment  and  zero  everywhere  else,  and  t'  a 
22 time  trend  covering  the  dummy  interval.  Thus,  D(YEARS)t 
represents  a  trend  which  operates  only  over  that  time  segment, 
and  is  zero  everywhere  else.  Table  3  reports  the  composite 
trend,  which  is  the  sum  of  trend  coefficients  operative  in  a 
given  period,  rather  than  the  original  coefficients.  Obviously, 
it  is  possible  to  include  several  dummy  variables,  several  trend 
segments,  and  to  mix  the  trend/shift  and  trends-with-bends 
approach. 
A  word  of  warning  on  the  subject  of  significance: 
statistical  significance  should  not  be  confused  with  economic 
significance.  A  large  trend  term  whose  standard  error  of 
estimate  is  also  large  (the  condition  which  defines  statistical 
insignificance)  can  certainly  reflect  an  economically  important 
process,  while  a  very  small  and  significant  coefficient  may  be 
virtually  meaningless  in  the  larger  scheme  of  things.  In  the 
studies  under  review,  statistical  significance  turns  out  to  be  a 
convenient  way  to  summarize  whether  a  coefficient  estimate  is 
large  and  troublesome  or  small  and  ignorable.17  For  example, 
Holland  and  Myers  (1979)  report  that  without  a  cyclical  control, 
the  trend  coefficient  on  before-tax  profitability  from  1946-76  is 
-0.19,  with  a  standard  error  of  0.08;  statistically  significant 
by  conventional  standards.  When  a  cyclical  control  is  added  the 
trend  coefficient  falls  to  -0.11,  with  a  standard  error  of  0.08; 
insignificant  by  virtue  of  the  reduced  estimate  value. 
Studies  of  profitability  in  the  U.SL  Readers  may  find  it 
useful  to  refer  to  Figures  1 and  2,  which  show  the  before  and 
23 after-tax  rates  of  profit  for  U.S.  nonfinancial  corporations  from 
1948-1985.  The  methodology  follows  that  used  widely  in  the 
literature  except  for  the  exclusion  of  land  from  the  denominator 
and  imputed  interest  from  the  numerator,  and  the  inclusion  of 
monetary  assets  in  the  denominator.  These  differences  and  the 
recent  revisions  in  the  U.S.  national  income  and  product  accounts 
reviewed  in  the  previous  section  affect  the  details  but  not  the 
overall  impression  conveyed  graphically.  The  before-tax  rate  of 
profit  has  a  clear  downward  tendency,  with  a  large  bulge  in  the 
mid-1960's.  The  after-tax  rate  of  profit  has  no  clear  tendency, 
but  also  has  a  large  bulge  in  the  mid-1960's.  Researchers  have 
asked  whether  these  tendencies  survive  cyclical  adjustments,  and 
have  given  a  surprisingly  heterogeneous  array  of  responses. 
Accounts  of  movements  in  the  before-tax  rate  of  profit  vary. 
Feldstein  and  Summers  and  Feldstein  et  al.  (refer  to  Table  3  for 
citation  dates)  identify  a  distinct  once-for-all  downward  shift 
occurring  around  1970  and  depressing  the  rate  of  return  for  the 
decade  thereafter  by  from  1.3  to  2.0  percentage  points.  Overlaid 
on  this  discrete  shift,  the  trend  is generally  nonsignificant  and 
is  found  to  be  positive  in  Feldstein  et  al.  Other  researchers 
using  slightly  different  cyclical  controls  also  find  a  shift 
after  1970.  The  overlaid  trend  is not  clear;  Grimm  finds  a 
significant  positive  trend,  Holland  and  Myers  a  nonsignificant 
negative  trend,  and  Allman  reports  a  significant  negative  trend. 
Lovell,  using  the  trends-with-bends  technique  and  the  log  of  the 
profit  rate  rather  than  its  level,  finds  a declining  trend  before 
24 1965,  a  more  steeply  declining  trend  from  1965  to  1970,  and  a 
rising  trend  thereafter. 
By  these  accounts,  the  before-tax  rate  of  return  was 
abnormally  low  in  the  early  1970's.  Liebling  argues  that  the 
1960's  witnessed  abnormally  high  profitability  owing  to  a 
confluence  of  specially  favorable  circumstancesand  includes  a 
dummy  variable  for  1962-1968.  I8  The  overall  trend  coefficient 
then  becomes  significant  and  negative.  In  other  regressions  not 
covered  in  the  table,  Liebling  finds  that  these  same  results 
obtain  when  a  dummy  for  1970-75  is  also  included  in  the 
regression  equation;  the  dummy  for  1970-75  is  negative, 
nonsignificant,  and  about  half  the  size  of  similar  shift  terms 
uncovered  by  Feldstein  and  Summers,  while  the  trend  term  remains 
negative  and  significant.  It  may  be  facetiously  concluded  that 
researchers  have  agreed  to  disagree  about  whether  the  tide  is 
coming  in  or  going  out. 
The  general  impression  that  profitability  rose  to  unusual 
peaks  in  the  mid-1960s  and  fell  to  unusual  troughs  in  the  1970s 
is  corroborated  by  the  two  studies  using  the  mark-up  pricing 
method.  Nordhaus  compares  the  actual  level  of  before-tax  profits 
to  the  level  predicted  by  his  mark-up  model,  and  finds 
underpredictions  from  about  1961  to  1967,  and  overpredictions 
from  1969  to  1973  (Nordhaus  1974,  Table  8,  p.  190).  Clark  finds 
more  or  less  the  same  pattern  (Clark  1984,  Figure  3,  p  159),  but 
also  that  the  cyclically  adjusted  before-tax  profit  share  rose  in 
the  1980's. 
25 There  is  a  clearer  consensus  that  the  after-tas  rate  of 
profit  has  no  fllll-period  trend.  Researchers  using  the  trends- 
with-bends  technique  agree  on  a  rising  trend  before  1965  and  a 
declining  trend  from  1965  to  1970,  but  disagree  about  whether  a 
rising  or  falling  trend  marks  the  1970's;  compare  Kopke  and 
Lovell.  Researchers  using  trend/shift  analysis  find  a weak 
rising  trend,  with  a  negative  shift  in  the  197Os,  but  the* 
statistical  significance  of  each  of  the  relevant  coefficients 
varies  across  studies;  compare  Grimm  to  Holland  and  Myers. 
Liebling  posits  an  upward  shift  in  the  1962-68  period,  which  is 
significant  and  positive  as  in  his  before-tax  equations. 
Studies  of  other  industrial  countries.  Table  4  shows  the 
before  and  after-tax  net  rate  of  profit  on  plant,  equipment,  and 
inventories  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  of  nine  countries  from 
the  Holland  (1984)  studies.  There  is a  perceptible  tendency  for 
rates  of  return  to  be  lower  in  the  1970's  than  in  previous 
periods.  As  Holland  notes  (pp.  8-9),  declines  are  more 
pronounced  for  before-tax  rates  of  return  than  for  after-tax 
rates  of  return. 
Most  of  the  regression  analyses  reported  in  Table  5 use  the 
simple  trend  method.  Significant  declining  trends  in  cyclically 
adjusted  before-tax  rates  of  profit  are  found  for  the 
manufacturing  sector  of  United  Kingdom,  Austria,  Finland,  Canada, 
Germany,  and  the  corporate  sector  of  Sweden.  Significant 
declining  trends  in  after-tax  rates  of  profit  in  manufacturing 
are  found  only  for  Austria,  Canada  and  Germany.  The  lone  study 
26 which  uses  the  trend/shift  technique  (with  a  dummy  variable 
covering  1969-73)  finds  a  significant  negative  shift  in  both 
before  and  after-tax  profitability  in  the  United  Kingdom,  anal  a 
significant  positive  shift  in  before  and  after-tax  profitability 
in  France. 
What  have  we  learned  post-Nordhaus?  A  safe  conclusion  from  _.-_----____~-  -~---___-  . 
studies  of  the  U.S.  is  that  before-tas  profitability  was  low  in 
the  1970s  compared  to  previous  periods.  There  is  little 
agreement  about  long  term  trends  in  before-tax  profitability  in 
the  U.S.,  but  some  agreement  that  after-tax  profitability  is 
essentially  trendless.  By  the  benchmark  of  the  196Os,  both 
species  of  profitability  declined  into  the  197Os,  but  it  is  hard 
to  ignore  the  unusual  nature  of  the  196Os,  a  leitmotif  that 
reappears  in  this  paper.  Declining  profitability  has  not  been 
confined  to  the  U.S.,  although  researchers  have  reached  the  same 
Scotch  verdict  on  whether  declines  reflect  long  term  trends  or 
cyclical  shocks.  Since  these  declines  coincide  with  a  period  of 
worldwide  economic  stagnation,  they  certainly  justify  more 
intensive  theoretical  scrutiny. 
The  wide  variety  of  impressions  conveyed  by  different 
researchers  about  long-term  trends  in  the  before-tax  rate  of 
profit  in  the  U.S.  testifies  to  the  difficulty  of  using 
econometric  techniques  to  identify  objective  properties  of 
economic  data.  It  is  clear,  for  instance,  that  where  one  chooses 
to  locate  shifts  influences  the  results  with  respect  to  trends. 
Another  difficulty  resides  in  the  restrictive  assumptions 
27 underlying  the  regression  analysis  itself.  The  implicit 
assumption  behind  the  use  of  the  cycle-trend  regression  approach 
is  that  exogenous  shocks  to  aggregate  demand  determine  the  level 
of  profits  in  the  short  run  and  that. lon,g-run  influences  are 
captured  by  the  trend  terms.  First,  one  is  inclined  to  ask  what 
are  the  causes  of  the  movements  revealed  by  the  trend  terms. 
Second,  one  is  inclined  to  ask  what  effects  these  changes  -in 
profitability  might  have  on  the  operation  of  the  economy, 
including  how  reduced  profitability  might  affect  the  level  of 
aggregate  demand  itself,  for  example  through  its  retarding 
influence  on  capital  accumulation.  Some  accounts  which  relate  to 
these  questions  are  discussed  in  the  remainder  of  this  paper. 
Decomposition  of  profitability,  An  alternative  framework 
for  analyzing  movements  in  profitability  developed  by  Weisskopf 
(1979)  provides  a  convenient  bridge  to  the  discussion  in  the  next 
section  of  causes  of  declining  profitability. 
Weisskopf  identifies  three  possible  explanatory  factors  for 
downward  movements  in  profitability:  the  relative  strength  of 
labor,  the  level  of  aggregate  demand,  and  the  average 
/ 
productivity  of  capital.  Each  of  these  explanatory  factors  gives 
rise  to  an  alternative  hypothesis  about  the  source  of  declining 
profitability.  The  rising  strength  of  labor  hypothesis  asserts 
that  workers'  ability  to  win  real  wage  increases  in  excess  of 
productivity  growth  during  periods  of  tight  labor  markets 
explains  declining  profit  rates.  The  demand  failure  hypothesis 
asserts  a  tendency  for  demand  to  stagnate  and  for  excess  capacity 
28 to  drag  down  the  rate  of  profit  through  the  mechanism  by  now 
familiar  to  the  reader.  The  declining  productivity  of  capital 
hypothesis  asser-ts a  long-run  tendency  for  capital  accumulation 
to  depress  average  capital  productivity.19  Weisskopf  suggests 
the  following  growth  accounting  framework  in which  the  rc1ativ.e 
empirical  importance  of  each  of  these  three  explanatory  factors 
can  be  evaluated: 
(7)  r 
=  (NOS/pK)  =  (NOS/VA)  (VA/VAf)  (VAr/pK) 
. 
r=  (NOS;VA)  t  (VA;VAf)  t  ("Af;pK) 
.A  dot  over  a variable  indicates  its  exponential  rate  of  growth, 
VA  represents  value  added,  VAf  represents  'the potential  or  full 
capacity  level  of  value  added,  and  operating  surplus  is  before 
tax.  Equation  7 permits  a  decomposition  that  corresponds  to  the 
elements  of  the  three  hypotheses.  The  first  hypothesis  implies  a 
declining  profit  share,  the  second  hypothesis  implies  a  declining 
rate  of  capacity  utilization  and  the  third  hypothesis  implies  a 
decline  in  full  employment  capital  productivity. 
Weisskopf  focusses  on  two  questions.  What  role  does  each  of 
these  factors  play  in  explaining  long-term  movements  in  the  rate 
of  profit?  What  role  does  each  factor  play  in  explaining 
movements  in  the  rate  of  profit  over  the  typical  business  cycle? 
Table  6 shows  the  results  which  address  the  first  question 
from  Weisskopf's  study  of  the  U.S.  nonfinancial  corporate  sector, 
and  two  studies  in  the  same  tradition.  Declines  in  capacity 
utilization  account  for  little  of  the  full-period  declines  in 
profitability  in  any  of  these  studies.  This,  of  course, 
29 contradicts  the  findings  of  those  researchers  surveyed  above 
argue  that  declines  in  profitability  can  be  explained  by 
variations  in  aggregate  demand.  All  three  studies  find  that 
who 
the 
decline  in  the  profit  share  accounts  for  most  of  the  declines  in 
profitability.  Finally,  while  Weisskopf  finds  that  declining 
capital  productivity  was  an  insignificant  factor  both  other 
I 
studies  find  declining  capital  productivity  played  a  role  in 
accounting  for  declines  in  the  rate  of  profit. 
Weisskopf  develops  a  more  complex  version  of  the  same  growth 
accounting  framework  in  order  to  address  two  issues.  First,  does 
the  fall  in  the  profit  share  reflect  a  real  change  in 
distributional  relations  between  capital  and  labor  or  does  it 
merely  reflect  the  natural  tendency  for  the  profit  share  to  track 
the  business  cycle  owing  to  the  existence  of  overhead  labor  and 
labor  hoarding.  Second,  if  there  has  been  a  real  change  in 
distributional  relations,  does  it  reflect  a  rise  in  labor's 
offensive  ("ability  of  the  working  class  to  achieve  real  wage 
gains  more  rapid  than  productivity  increases")  or  defensive 
("workers'  ability  to  pass  on  to  capitalists  a  disproportionate 
share  of  the  real  income  loss  resulting  from  adverse  relative 
price  changes")  strength  (Weisskopf  1979,  p.  372). 
Weisskopf  finds  that  even  after  accounting  for  capacity 
utilization  and  overhead  labor  effects,  substantial  shifts  in  the 
profit  share  occurred  over  the  full  period.  His  conclusion  is 
that 
II  .  .  . the  long-run  and  cycle-to-cycle  increases  in  labour 
strength  were  predominately  defensive  in  nature.  The  basic 
30 reason  for  the  downward  trend  in  the  rate  of  profit  from 
1949  to  1975  was  an  increasingly  serious  deterioration  in 
the  terms  of  trade  of  the  NFCB  [nonfinancial  corpora-te 
business]  sector,  whose  negative  impact  on  real  sectoral 
income  was  absorbed  to  a  proportionately  larger  extent  by 
profits  than  by  wages."(pp.  372-373) 
The  same  accounting  framework  is  applied  to  movements  in  the 
rate  of  profit  over  the  business  cycle,  where  it  is  clear  the 
rate  of  capacity  utilization  does  not  track  the*rate  of  profit  as 
symmetrically  as  the  regression  analyses  surveyed  above 
implicitly  assume.20  The  rate  and  share  of  profits  generally 
lead  capacity  utilization.  Hahnel  and  Sherman  (1982,  Table  5) 
observe  that  on  average  over  the  post-war  period,  the  National 
Bureau  of  Economic  Research  cycle  peak  was' preceded  by  the  peak 
in  the  share  of  profit  by  8.8  quarters,  by  the  peak  in  the  rate 
of  profit  by  7.3  quarters,  and  by  the  peak  in  the  level  of 
capacity  utilization  by  3.8  quarters. 
Weisskopf  divides  the  cycle  into  three  distinct  phases  for 
analytic  purposes:  phase  A,  after  the  cycle  trough  but  before  the 
profit  rate  peak;  phase  B,  after  the  profit  rate  peak  but  before 
the  cycle  peak;  and  phase  C,  from  cycle  peak  to  cycle  trough. 
During  phases  A  and  C,  changes  in  capacity  utilization  and  their 
now-familiar  effects  on  productivity  play  the  major  role  in 
regulating  profits.  But  in  the  late  expansion,  phase  B,  demand, 
output,  and  productive  capacity  grow  at  very  much  the  same  rate, 
and  it  is  possible,  I  believe,  to  identify  patterns  in  this  phase 
that  are  effectively  independent  of  the  "noise"  created  by 
fluctuations  in  capacity  utilization. 
The  data  relating  to  phase  B  of  the  cycle  from  three  studies 
31 are  shown  in  Table  7.  Changes  in  capacity  utilization  indeed 
play  a  minor  role  in  accounting  for  changes  in  profitability  in 
phase  B  of  the  average  cycle.  The  consistency  with  which  changes 
in  the  profit  share  account  for  declines  in  the  profit  rate 
suggests  that  the  assumption  of  a  constant  mark-up  over  normal 
unit  costs  is  misleading.  To  the  extent  one  is  inclined  to 
believe  that  actual  costs  closely  approximate  normal  costs  during 
the  B  phase,  changes  in  the  profit  share  reflect  changes  in  the 
mark-up  in  this  phase  of  the  cycle.21  How,  after  all,  do  firms 
know  what  their  normal  costs  are  but  by  observing  their  actual 
costs  during  a  period  of  normalcy? 
Argument  about  the  ability  of  workers  to  win  real  wage 
increases  under  favorable  labor  market  conditions  has  been  going 
on  since  Keynes  and  Kalecki  first  proposed  that  real  wages  are 
determined  in  the  product  market  by  firms'  pricing  policies,  The 
patterns  uncovered  by  Weisskopf  and  others  represent  a  challenge 
to  this  way  of  thinking,  because  they  suggest  that  the  mark-up  is 
actually  determined  by  some  kind  of  bargaining  process  probably, 
I  suspect,  involving  both  firms  and  workers  in  the  labor  market 
and  firms  and  customers  in  the  product  market.  Taylor  (1985)  and 
Marglin  (1984A,  1984B)  incorporate  the  contest  in  the  labor 
market  into  the  supply  side  of  their  theoretical  models. 
A  variable  mark-up  suggests  some  natural  modifications  to 
the  regression  approach  above.  On  the  supply  side,  it  may  be 
advisable  to  use  dummy  or  proxy  variables  to  model  events  in 
phase  B.  On  the  demand  side,  mark-up  variability  raises  the 
32 question  of  the  adequacy  of  using  the  level  of  demand  in 
explaining  short-term  movements  in  profitability. 
The  volume  of  after-tax  profits  realized  in  a  short  period 
equals  the  sum  of  rentier  consumption,  investment,  the  budget 
deficit  and  the  trade  surplus  (assuming  zero  saving  out  of  wages) 
according  to  Kalecki's  profit  identity  (1971,  pp.  78-82), 
. 
familiar  among  neo-Keynesian  economists.  Now,  if  capacity 
utilization  increases  exclusively  because  of  the  demand  effects 
of  a  real  wage  increase  (reduced  mark-up),  it  will  certainly  have 
a  different  effect  on  total  profits  than  the  equivalent  increase 
in  utilization  brought  about  by  an  investment  boom  with  constant 
real  wages.  Some  account  of  the  composition  of  demand  may  have  a 
place  in  explaining  movements  in  profitability.  One  suggestion 
might  be  to  embed  the  study  of  cyclical  movements  in 
profitability  in  a  more  fully  specified  model  of  aggregate  demand 
and  supply,  such  as  a  version  of  the  previously  mentioned  models 
of  Taylor  or  Marglin. 
33 Explanations  of  Declining  Profitability 
l(In my  view,  it  would  be  worth  studying  growth  models  that 
would  accommodate  various  degrees  of  profitability. 
Discussing  them  should  help  us  to  understand  some  features 
of  sustained  unemployment  in  slowly  growing  economies,  in 
which  a  lack  of  profitability  prevents  expansion  of 
productive  capacities." 
Edmond  Malinvaud  (1984,  p.  61). 
I  now  turn  to  explanations  of  the  causes  and  consequences  of 
low  profitability  in  the  1970s.  Causes  proposed  range  from 
diminishing  returns  to  capital  induced  by  a  low  cost  of  funds; 
intensified  international  competition;  profit  squeezes  driven  by 
rising  real  wages,  flagging  productivity  growth,  rising  raw 
material  prices,  or  some  combination  thereof;  declining  average 
capital  productivity;  and  changes  in  effective  tax  rates.  The 
"stagnationist"  school  of  neo-Marxian  and  neo-Keynesian 
economists,  which  regards  low  profitability  as  a  consequence  of 
the  stagnation  of  aggregate  demand,  is  somewhat  underrepresented 
in  my  discussion;  refer  to  Steindl  (1979)  for  elaboration.  To 
illustrate  the  range  of  opinions  I  do  discuss  in  detail,  note 
that  the  first  explanation  implies  that  profitability  fell 
because  of  an  abundance  of  capital,  while  many  profit  squeeze 
theorists  perceive  a  declining  rate  of  capital  accumulation 
because  of  reduced  profitability. 
Cost  of  funds.  In  a  seminal  contribution,  Nordhaus  (1974) 
argues  that  a  declining  cost  of  fundsz2  induced  an  increase  in 
capital  deepening:  firms  chose  to  adopt  progressively  less 
profitable  investment  projects.  The  cost  of  funds  ordinarily 
34 con.tains  a premium  to  cover  nondiversifiable  risk.  Nordhaus 
argues  that  as  memories  of  the  Great  Depression  faded,  investors 
reduced  the  risk  premium.  More  recently,  Bosworth  (1982) 
proposes  that  accelerated  inflation  in  the  1970s  drove  down  the 
real  rate  of  interest,  reducing  the  cost  of  funds.z3 
Both  hypotheses  attribute  reduced  profitability  to  an 
abundance  of  capital  relative  to  labor.  Indeed,  Bosworth  argues 
in  the  context  of  an  extended  refutation  of  the  "capital  scarcity 
thesis"  that  insufficient  after-tax  profitability  has  reduced  the 
incentive  to  save  and  invest  in  the  U.S. 
It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  low  cost  of  funds  hypothesis 
because  the  cost  of  funds  is  nqt  observable.  Firms  raise  funds 
in  equity  and  bond  markets,  and  the  cost  of  funds  reflects  the 
optimal  mix  of  debt  and  equity,  the  effects  of  taxes,  and  the 
effects  of  expected  inflation,  all  challenging  to  quantify. 
Attempts  to  measure  the  cost  of  funds  have  led  to  divergent 
estimates,  and  Bosworth  himself,  in  a  later  article  (1985,  pp. 
19-27)  demonstrates  that  the  differences  can  be  substantial. 
Other  researchers  (Corcoran  1977,  p.  5;  Kopke  1978;  Holland  and 
Myers  1979)  who  compare  their  estimates  of  the  cost  of  funds  to 
the  rate  of  return,  however,  generally  find  that  thy  decline  in 
the  rate  of  profit  was  not  reflected  in  a  lower  cost  of  funds  in 
the  1970s.  Holland  and  Myers  (1979),  for  instance,  report  that 
"the  decline  in corporate  real  profitability  over  the  last  decade 
[1966-761  has  not  been  matched  by  a  corresponding  decline  in  the 
real  opportunity  cost  of  capital  [cost  of  funds]"(p.  147). 
35 One  way  of  approaching  the  link  between  profitability  and 
the  cost  of  funds  is  through  Tobin's  q,  the  ratio  of  the  market 
value  of  a  firm  (i.e.  the  sum  of  its  debt  and  equity  at  market 
value)  to  the  replacement  cost  of  the  firm's  tangible  assets. 
Because  the  market  value  of  a  firm  is  the  present  discounted 
value  of  investors'  expectations  of  its  future  earnings  stream, 
Tobin's  q  can  be  expressed  as  the  ratio  of  the  expected  profit 
rate  to  the  cost  of  funds  (i.e.  the  discount  rate  of  investors) 
under  some  conditions  (Tobin  and  Brainard  1977,  p.  244).  To  the 
extent  that  current  profitability  is  an  indicator  of  future 
profitability,  movements  in  the  q  ratio  can  then  be  interpreted 
in  terms  of  the  ratio  of  the  rate  of  return  to  the  cost  of  funds. 
The  Nordhaus-Bosworth  explanation  cast  into  q-theoretic  terms 
predicts  that  q will  fluctuate  around  its  long-run  equilibrium 
value,  equal  to  unity  under  restrictive  conditions.24  In 
equilibrium,  the  cost  of  funds  and  rate  of  profit  should  rise  and 
fall  pari  passu. 
Studies  of  q  in  the  U.S.  show  rising  values  until  1965,  and 
then  falling  values  into  the  197Os,  suggesting  that  the  rate  of 
return  fell  by  more  than  the  cost  of  funds  in  the  later  period. 
Table  8 displays  some  average  values  of  q,  the  rate  of  return  on 
nonfinancial  corporate  assets,  and  the  implied  discount  rate. 
Like  measures  of  the  cost  of  funds,  measures  of  q  vary  widely. 
The  procedure  I used  does  not  mark  corporate  debt  to  market,  but 
does  use  the  market  values  of  equity  from  the  Flow  of  Funds 
Accounts,  Nonetheless,  in  its  movements,  it  resembles  the 
36 typical  finding  of  rising  values  up  until  the  mid  19GOs,  then 
falling  values  through  the  1970s.  The  effects  on  q  of  the  bull 
market  of  the  1980s  are  somewhat  obscured  by  the  use  of  five-year 
averages  in  Table  8.  For  more  carefully  constructed  measures  of 
q,  see  Holland  and  Myers  (1984)  and  Von  Furstenberg  (1977).  It 
is  clear  that  the  decline  in q  in my  data  from  1966-70  to  1971-75 
was  mainly  due  to  a  decline  in  profitability,  and  that  the 
continued  decline  to  1976-80  was  due  to  a  combination  of  lower 
profitability  and  a  higher  cost  of  funds.  25  Impressions  about 
movements  in  q  for  other  countries  can  be  found  in  Holland  (1984) 
and  Chan-Lee  (1986). 
Import  competition.  Kaldor,  commenting  on  Nordhaus's  1974 
paper  (in  Nordhaus  1974,  p.  209-210)  gainsays  the  capital 
deepening  explanation,  and  in  its  place,  offers  an  explanation 
based  on  import  penetration  of  oligopolistic  markets  under  entry- 
deterring  price  leadership. 
Increasing  world  trade  (as  a  share  of  world  output)  is  a 
persistent  feature  of  the  post-war  period.  If market  structures 
in  internationally  traded  goods  were  oligopolistic  at  the 
beginning  of  the  period,  a general  increase  in world  trade  would 
raise  the  degree  of  effective  competition,  and  cut  into  the 
oligopoly  element  of  the  mark-up.26  This  story  fits  the  facts  in 
two  respects.  First,  intra-industry  trade  has  grown  as  a  share 
of  trade  between  industrial  nations  (Aquino  1978).  Second,  the 
more  pronounced  decline  in manufacturing  profitability  than 
aggregate  business  sector  profitability  visible  in  Table  9 may 
37 reflect  the  greater  proportion  of  internationally  traded  goods  in 
the  manufacturing  sector;  see  also  Holland  (1984,  p.  25). 
The  explanation  of  globally  declining  profitability  as  the 
epiphenomenon  of  rising  world  trade  suffers  two  flaws.  First, 
lower  mark-ups  from  greater  effective  competition  may  not  reduce 
profitability;  Dutt  (1984)  presents  the  "stagnationist"  argument 
that  an  increase  in  product  market  competition  raises  the*rate  of 
profit  because  of  the  accelerator  effects  on  investment  of  higher 
real  wages.  Recall  that  greater  investment  realizes  greater 
profits  through  Kalecki's  profit  identity.  Second,  international 
competition  probably  reduces  labor's  ability  to  achieve  higher 
real  wages  under  some  conditions  --  think  of  the  U.S.  in  the 
1980s  --  thereby  raising  the  interesting  question  of  the 
determinants  of  which  effect  (mark-up  raising  or  lowering) 
prevails. 
Studies  of  the  mark-up  pricing  hypothesis  have  produced  a 
major  puzzle.  Coutts  et  al.  (1978)  find  the  residuals  between 
actual  prices  and  the  prices  predicted  by  their  model  of  U.K. 
manufacturing  are  uncorrelated  with  import  prices,  as  if  foreign 
competition  has  no  effect  on  mark-ups. 
Profit  squeezes.  Sylos-Labini  (1979A)  argues  that  because 
import  prices  are  already  included  in  the  standard  costs  Coutts 
et  al.  estimate,  the  results  they  obtain  "would  no  longer  appear 
paradoxical"(p.  162).  For  Sylos-Labini,  the  issue  is  important 
because  he  argues  that  foreign  competition  has  been  the  "main 
reason"  (p.  161)  for  declining  profit  shares.  Sylos-Labini 
38 (19798)  elaborates:  the  upward  pressures  of  wages  and  raw 
material  prices  against  the  limitations  imposed  by  foreign 
competition  on  product  prices  account  for  a  declining  tendency  in 
the  mark-up. 
International  competition  is  an  important  ingredient  in 
explanations  of  declining  profitability  based  on  rising  labor 
I 
strength  or  wage  costs.  A  long-standing  proposition  associated 
with  Keynes  and  Kalecki  is  that  workers  can  effectively  bargain 
only  over  the  money  wage.  Under  mark-up  pricing,  a  general 
increase  in  wage  costs  will  be  fully  passed  through  to  higher 
prices,  leaving  real  wages  unchanged  (unless  there  is  a  raw 
material  sector  willing  to  take  the  hit).  Product  demand  is 
assumed  to  stay  constant--there  are  no  wealth  effects--which 
permits  firms  to  pass  through  costs  without  fear  of  losing 
customers.  Glyn  and  Sutcliffe  (1972)  suggest  that  foreign 
competition  will  inhibit  firms  from  passing  through  their  cost 
increases,  and  that  in  its  presence,  rising  labor  strength 
generates  real  distributional  changes  rather  than  mere 
inflation.*'  As  noted  above,  the  possibility  that  import 
competition  can  erode  worker  bargaining  power  must  also  be 
acknowledged. 
Recent  work  in  the  Marxian  profit  squeeze  tradition  enriches 
the  profit  squeeze  hypothesis  in  two  ways.  First,  conflict  over 
the  intensity  of  labor  and  hence  labor  productivity  is  proposed 
as  an  additional  source  of  rising  unit  labor  costs.  The 
intensity  of  labor,  in  turn,  is  hypothesized  to  reflect  workers' 
39 individual  or  collective  decisions  about  how  much  effort  to 
provide,  which  they  make  by  comparing  the  cost  of  losing  their 
jobs  (cost  of  job  loss)  with  the  benefits  of  shirking.  For 
elaboration,  see  the  empirical  study  of  Weisskopf  et  al.  (1983) 
or  the  theoretical  model  of  Bowles  (1985).  Second,  conflict  over 
the  conditions  of  production  and  distribution  is  situated  in  a 
broader  institutional  context  that  includes  struggles  over' state 
policy,  struggles  between  industrial  and  nonindustrial  economies, 
and  conflict  between  labor  and  capital.  The  concept  of  a  social 
structure  of  accumulation  sums  up  the  institutional  fabric;  for 
more  explanation,  consult  D.  Gordon  et  al.  (1982). 
Social  structures  of .accumulation  are  hypothesized  to  have  a 
life  cycle  of  their  own,  eventually  outliving  their  usefulness  in 
smoothing  the  path  for  capital  accumulation.  For  example,  post- 
war  collective  bargaining  is  sometimes  described  as  an  "accord" 
which  initially  fostered  a high  intensity  of  labor  effort  and  a 
high  rate  of  profitability,  but  eventually  broke  down  under  the 
efforts  of  both  sides  to  escape  its  terms.  When  a  social 
structure  decays,  an  era  of'low  profitability  and  slow  growth 
ensues,  during  which  new  institutional  solutions  are  fashioned. 
Long  waves  of  economic  activity  are  reflections  of  waves  of 
institutional  innovation.  The  theory  might  be  described  as  a 
kind  of  institutional  version  of  Schumpeter's  theory  of 
capitalist  development. 
Bowles  et  al.  (1986)  d  erive  an  econometric  model  of  after- 
tax  nonfinancial  corporate  profitability  in  the  post  war  U.S. 
40 economy  inspired  by  the  social  structure  of  accumulation 
approach.  This  study  is  a  companion  to  Weisskopf  et  al.  (1983), 
in  which  the  same  three  authors  apply  a  similar  framework  to  the 
slowdown  in  labor  productivity  after  the  mid  1960s.  The  flavor 
of  their  analysis  is  conveyed  by  the  passage  below.  By 
decomposing  changes  in  profitability  using  the  actual  values  of 
the  independent  variables  and  estimated  coefficients  of  their 
econometric  model,  Bowles  et  al.  are  able  to  conclude  that, 
1,  .the  major  source  of  profitability  decline  from  1959- 
1966't.o  1966-1973  was  the  erosion  of  the  labor  accord--and 
the  decline  of  the  cost  of  job  loss  in  particular.  From 
1966-1973  to  1973-1979,  by  contrast,  declines  in  the 
utilization  variables  and  in  the  international  strength  of 
United  States  capital  were  the  major  -factors  contributing  to 
the  fall  in  the  profit  rate"(1986,  p.  154). 
While  it  has  been  the  hallmark  of  most  neo-Marxian  and  many 
neo-Keynesian  economists  to  advance  explanations  involving  class 
conflict,  these  are  by  no  means  their  exclusive  property.  A 
similar  view  of  recent  events  differing  in  some  details28  is 
offered  by  mainstream  economist  Peter  Clark: 
1, 
.  .  Generally  tight  labor  market  conditions  in  the  late 
1960s  and  early  1970s  could  have  shifted  the  balance  of 
power  in  favor  of  labor,  cutting  into  capital's  share.  This 
new  division  of  output  prevailed  until  the  determination  to 
reduce  inflation  even  at  the  risk  of  protracted  high 
unemployment  started  moving  the  balance  of  power  back  toward 
capital  in  the  1980s.  The  mid-1970s  downturn  might  have 
been  ineffective  in  changing  the  climate  for  income-share 
determination  because  the  recovery  was  relatively  rapid  .  . 
Back-to-back  recessions  in  the  early  1980s  could  have  had 
more  of  an  effect  on  the  labor  market  climate,  explaining 
the  apparent  rise  in  capital's  share"(Clark  1983,  p.  161). 
In  both  views,  economic  slack  is  a  policy  response  to  rising 
labor  strength. 
Wolff  (1986)  also  argues  that  the  combination  of  declining 
41 productivity  growth  and  rising  labor  compensation  conspired  to 
depress  profitability  in  the  early  1970s.  He  emphasizes  upward 
pressure  on  labor  costs  exerted  by  the  social  rather  than  the 
private  wage,  and  in  particular  by  rising  social  security 
contributions,  and  regards  the  productivity  slowdown  as  an 
exogenous  event. 
Wolff  uses  a  sophisticated  input-output  framework  to 
calculate  the  hypothetical  general  rate  of  profit  that  would 
exist  if  all  industries  earned  the  same  rate  of  profit;  i.e.  to 
reconstruct  the  price  system  so  that  it  represents  an  economy  in 
a  state  of  long-run  equilibrium.2s  The  actual  average  profit 
rate  will  generally  differ  from  the  hypothetical  general  rate. 
Wolff  reports  an  interesting  counterfactual  exercise, 
reproduced  below  for  the  years  of  decline  in  the  rate  of  profit. 
Reading  across  rows  shows  the  change  in  the  general  rate  of 
profit  that  would  occur  if  real  per  worker  consumption  remained 
constant  at  that  year's  value,  and  the  technology  changed.  For 
example,  reading  across  row  1,  the  matrices  of  circulating  and 
fixed  capital  and  the  vector  of  direct  labor  requirements  are 
actual  values,  while  the  vector  of  per  worker  consumption 
requirements  stays  at  its  1967  level.  Reading  down  columns, 
technology  stays  constant  and  consumption  changes.  Thus  reading 
down  the  main  diagonal  shows  the  actual  change  in  the  general 
rate  of  profit. 
42 Constant  Technology 
Constant  1967  1976 
Consumption 
1967  16.8% 
1976  12.9 
----------------- 
Source:  Wolff  (1986,  Table  7,  p.  102) 
14.7% 
11.7 
Even  if  consumption  per  worker  had  remained  stable  from  1967  to 
1976,  changes  in  technology  alone  would  have  depressed  the  rate 
of  profit.  The  possibility  that  technological  change  can  reduce 
profitability  is  discussed  further  below.  The  rise  in 
consumption  per  worker,  which  Wolff  attributes  to  rising  social 
security  contributions  (p.  104),  brought  the  rate  of  return  down 
further.30 
Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985)  combine  increasing  raw  material 
prices,  real  wage  rigidities,  reduced  investment  and  the 
productivity  slowdown.  Since  I am  concerned  with  their  account 
of  profitability,  I  focus  on  the  supply  side  of  their  model. 
The  centerpiece  of  Bruno  and  Sachs'  supply  story  is  a  three 
factor  production  function.  Gross  output,  Q,  is  a  function  of 
capital,  K,  labor,  L  and  raw  materials,  N.  To  simplify 
exposition,  they  assume  that  the  production  function  is  "weakly 
separable"  in  the  raw  material  input,  so  that  it  can  be  solved  in 
stages:  Q=Q[G(K,L),N]. 
By  the  assumption  of  weak  separability,  increases  in  raw 
material  prices  create  homothetic  shifts  in  the  factor  price 
frontier  (the  dual  of  the  production  function)  analytically 
equivalent  to  Hicks-neutral  technical  regress.  The  factor  price 
43 frontier  represents  the  set  of  maximal  marginal  products 
permitted  by  the  available  technologies  and  existing  raw  material 
prices,  or  F[(f(W9,R),Pm]=0,  where  Wg,  R,  and  Pm  represent  the 
product  wage,  profit  rate,  and  relative  price  of  materials.  It 
is  convex  to  the  origin  in  product  wage-profit  rate  space,  by 
virtue  of  well-behaved  neoclassical  technology.31 
With  a given  supply  of  capital  and  labor,  both  fully' 
employed,  and  a  raw  material  price  shock,  the  factor  price 
frontier  shifts  inward  homothetically.  Continued  full  employment 
requires  that  the  product  wage  and  rate  of  profit  decline 
proportionately,  so  that  the  original  capital-labor  ratio  will  be 
maintained.  If  real  wages  are  rigid,  and  technology  is  "putty- 
putty",  firms  substitute  the  given  supply  of  capital  for  labor, 
so  that  employment  falls  short  of  full  employment.  This  type  of 
unemployment  Bruno  and  Sachs  call  "classical  unemployment", 
following  Malinvaud's  (1977)  famous  distinction  between  Keynesian 
and  classical  unemployment.32  Keynesian  unemployment  is 
represented  by  a position  off  the  factor  price  frontier  caused  by 
insufficient  aggregate  demand. 
Bruno  and  Sachs  attempt  to  measure  the  contribution  made  by 
real  wage  rigidities,  which  they  attribute  to  institutional  wage 
setting  practices  like  indexation,  to  total  unemployment.  The 
gap  between  actual  product  wages  and  the  hypothetical  product 
wage  which  would  bring  about  full  employment  with  the  existing 
capital  stock  is  called  the  "real  wage  gap"  (p.  31).  The  wage 
gap  plays  an  important  role  in  their  explanation  of  stagnation 
44 after  1973. 
Movements  in  the  rate  of  profit  are  resolved  into  shifts  in 
the  factor  price  frontier  due  to  the  combined  effects  of 
technical  progress  and  raw  material  price  changes,  and  movements 
along  the  factor  price  frontier.  The  factor  price  frontiers  for 
the  manufacturing  sectors  of  four  countries  (U.S.,  U.K.,  Germany, 
and  Japan)  are  estimated  assuming  that  the  function  Q[G(K,L),N] 
exhibits  a  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  between  raw 
materials  and  G(K,L),  that  the  function  G(K,L)  is  Cobb-Douglas 
(elasticity  of  substitution  equal  unity),  that  technical  progress 
is Harrod-neutral,  and  of  course,  that  constant  returns  to  scale 
prevail.33  The  general  impression  is  that: 
"until  1972  there  was  an  upward  movement  in  [product  wages 
per  efficiency  unit  of  labor]  more  or  less  along  a  given  FPF 
[factor  price  frontier],  a  clear  shift  to  a  new  FPF 
after  1972,  and  movement  down  the  new  curve  after  1973-74" 
(P*  52).  [Movement  down  the  new  curve  means  lower  product 
wages  and  higher  rates  of  profit.] 
In  reference  to  the  U.S.,  this  conclusion  supports  Feldstein- 
Summers'  contention  that  there  was  a downward  shift  in  the  rate 
of  profit  in  the  1970's  due  to  the  raw  material  price  effect,  but 
also  indicates  a  downward  drift  in  before-tax  profitability  owing 
to  persistent  product  wage  pressure  from  1955  to  1972.  The 
framework  of  estimating  the  factor  price  frontier  directly  thus 
has  much  to  recommend  it,  since  it  breaks  movements  in 
profitability  down  into  their  proximate  causes  rather  than 
relying  on  hard-to-interpret  trend  terms  as  do  the  regression 
analyses  discussed  above.  Further,  as  the  factor  price  frontier 
is  a  tool  of  analysis  familiar  to  neoclassical,  neo-Keynesian, 
45 and  neo-Marxian  economists,  the  fact  that  it  can  be  given 
empirical  content  should  be  encouraging  to  a  broad  range  of 
economists. 
Bruno  and  Sachs'  macroeconomic  story  revolves  around  the 
interaction  between  the  profit  squeeze  identified  above,  capital 
accumulation,  and  productivity  growth.  The  following  passage 
. 
conveys  the  flavor  of  the  analysis. 
"In  the  late  1960s  and  early  197Os,  a  real  wage  explosion 
(particularly  in  Europe  and  Japan)  caused  a major  shift  in 
income  distribution  away  from  profits  and  towards  labor. 
Even  before  the  oil  shocks,  therefore,  many  OECD  countries 
faced  a major  problem  of  declining  profitability  and  slowing 
growth.  In  the  second  phase  real  wages  did  not  decelerate 
(outside  of  the  United  States)  to  make  room  for  the  raw 
material  price  increases,  so  the  profit  squeeze-intensified. 
In  the  third  phase  low  profitability  and  rising  unemployment 
slowed  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  and  productivity 
growth.  Real  wage  increases  were  reduced,  but  so  too  was 
productivity  growth,  with  the  result  that  the  excess  of 
wages  over  full-employment  productivity  persisted  into  the 
early  198Os"(p.  167). 
The  last  sentence  throws  the  real  wage  gap  into  sharp 
relief.  The  passage  also  illustrates  the  thesis  that  real  wages 
in  the  U.S.  are  less  rigid  than  in  other  OECD  countries  (Sachs 
1979).  Bruno  and  Sachs  regard  the  profit  squeeze  in  the  U.S.  as 
less  severe  than  elsewhere,  and  the  U.S.  economy  as  more 
"Keynesian"  than  others  (p.  274). 
In  comparison  with  economists  who  regard  declines  in  the 
cost  of  funds  as  the  cause  (through  capital  deepening)  of  lower 
profitability,  Bruno  and  Sachs  (pp.  23-26)  regard  the  low  real 
interest  rates  in  the  wake  of  the  first  OPEC  price  shock  as  a 
consequence  of  the  profit  squeeze.  The  world  interest  rate 
clears  the  market  for  world  saving  and  investment.  Saving  is 
46 positively  related  to  interest  rates,  and  positively  related  to 
raw  material  prices  if  raw  material  producers'  weighted  marginal 
propensity  to  save  exceeds  the  weighted  marginal  propensity  to 
save  of  material  importing  countries.  Investment  is  inversely 
related  to  real  interest  rates  for  familiar  neoclassical  reasons, 
and  inversely  related  to  permanent  changes  in  raw  material 
prices,  since  these  reduce  the  future  expected  marginal  product 
of  capital  (shift  the  factor  price  frontier  in).  Thus,  the  first 
OPEC  price  shock  shifted  the  saving  function  up,  the  investment 
function  down,  (with  S  and  I  on  the  vertical  axis)  reducing 
investment  and  real  interest  rates  simultaneously.3" 
Investment  and  profitability.  Bruno  and  Sachs's  treatment 
of  accumulation  departs  from  the  conventional  neoclassical 
theory  of  investment  in  which  firms  target  a  desired  stock  of 
capital  given  by  (with  Cobb-Douglas  technology): 
(8)  K*  =  (W/Z) 
where  C  is  the  profit  share,  Y  real  output,  Z  the  rental  cost  of 
capital.  As  R.  Gordon  and  Veitch  (1984)  observe,  this 
formulation  assumes  that  real  wages  are  instantaneously  inversely 
related  to  the  rental  cost  of  capital,  so  that  any  increase  in 
real  wages  will  be  offset  by  lower  capital  costs,  leaving  the 
pure  profitability  of  the  firm  unchanged. 
"Thus  the  neoclassical  approach  leaves  no  room  for  theories 
that  predict  a  profit  squeeze,  investment  slump,  and  growth 
slowdown  following  a  period  of  excessive  real  wage  growth" 
(R.  Gordon  and  Veitch,  1984,  p.  11). 
In  models  similar  to  that  of  Bruno  and  Sachs,  Malinvaud 
(1980,  1982)  suggests  that  the  pure  profit  rate--the  gap  between 
47 the  rate  of  return  and  the  rental  cost  of  capital--regulates 
investment  spending  in  the  medium  run.  His  investment  equation 
(1980,  p.  33)  thus  provides  a  channel  whereby  a  profit  squeeze 
induces  an  investment  slump  and  prolonged  unemployment  (which, 
incidentally,  often  turns  into  the  Keynesian  variety).  Malinvaud 
notes  the  similarity  of  his  approach  to  the  q-theory  of  _ 
investment  (Tobin  and  Brainard,  1977)  but  also  acknowledges  that 
stock  prices  may  be  excessively  speculative  along  the  lines  of 
Shiller  (1981)  for  the  q-ratio  to  provide  much  information  about 
profitability.  This  suggestion  is  explored  by  Ueda  and  Yoshikawa 
(1986). 
.  A  tradition  associated  with  Kalecki  (1971),  Tinbergen 
(19381,  Meyer  and  Kuh  (1957)  and  Duesenberry  (1958),  emphasizes 
that  firms  employ  a hierarchy  of  finance,  with  internal  funds 
taking  priority  over  borrowing  or  selling  equity.  A  very  clear 
description  of  the  characteristics  of  the  capital  market  which 
create  financial  constraints  is  Wood  (1975,  pp.  4-9). 
The  financial  constraint  hypothesis  is  questioned  by 
neoclassical  theorists  on  theoretical  and  econometric  grounds. 
Eisner  and  Strotz  (1963)  comment  on  the  theoretical  foundation: 
"One  should  not  expect  a  firm,  no  matter  how  high  its 
current  profits  or  expected  future  profits,  to  wish  to 
invest  unless  the  contemplated  addition  to  capital  stock  is 
expected  to  increase  expected  profits  or  have  an  expected 
return  higher  than  that  from  alternative  uses  of  funds."(p. 
124). 
Jorgenson  (1971)  comments  on  the  econometric  evidence  from 
the  vantage 
responsible 
point  afforded  by  equation  8 above  (he  is  largely 
for  its  use): 
48 ,I 
.  .  .  where  internal  finance  variables  appear  as 
significant  determinants  of  desired  capital,  they  represent 
the  level  of  output.  When  both  output  and  cash  flow  are 
included  as  possible  determinants,  only  one  is  a  significant 
determinant"(p.  1133). 
Econometric  evidence  in  contradiction  to  Jorgenson's  comment 
includes  Fazzari  and  Mott  (1986/87);  Abel  and  Blanchard  (1986) 
find  that  profitability  plays  a  significant  ind_ependent  role  in  a 
q-theory  investment  equation. 
In  theoretical  work,  neo-Keynesian  models  (Asimakopolous 
1971)  frequently  posit  a direct  relationship  between  expected 
profitability  and  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation.  The 
equilibrium  rate  of  profit  and  capital  accumulation  are  then 
determined  by  the  interaction  of  such  an  independent  investment 
equation  (some  sort  of  independent  investment  function  being  the 
differentia  specifica  of  Keynesian  models)  and  the  saving 
function  which  establishes  what  level  of  profitability  will  be 
realized  for  a  given  level  of  investment,  through  the  Cambridge 
growth  equation.35 
Hybrid  investment  models  incorporating  profitability  are 
attracting  more  attention,  perhaps  as  a  reaction  to  the  failure 
of  any  single  investment  model  to  dominate  in  econometric  tests 
(Clark  1979;  Kopke  1985).  Taylor's  (1985)  theoretical  model,  for 
instance,  combines  elements  of  the  q-theory  and  the  accelerator. 
Gordon  and  Veitch  (1984),  Fazzari  and  Mott  (1986/87),  and  Abel 
and  Blanchard  (1986)  develop  hybrid  econometric  models. 
Facts  which  resist  stylization.  Table  10  presents  some  of 
the  relevant  aggregate  data  on  capital  formation  and 
49 profitability  in  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  of  the  U.S. 
economy.  These  statistics  illustrate  the  major  theme  raised  by 
Bosworth:  the  1970s  is  a period  of  normal  capital  accumulation. 
Only  by  comparison  with  the  super-normal  growth  during  1960s  can 
a  case  be  made  for  after-tax  profitability  slowing  investment  in 
the  1970s.  This  interpretation  holds  whether  you  judge  _ 
* 
investment  by  the  share  of  net  investment  in  net  domestic 
product,  or  the  ratio  of  real  net  investment  to  the  real  net 
stock  of  fixed  capital. 
These  statistics  resemble  evidence  for  the  total  economy 
presented  by  Bosworth  (1982,  p*  275),  providing  an  opportunity  to 
return  to  the  capital  deepening  explanation  of  the  before-tax 
profitability  decline.36  A problem  is  identified  by  Solow: 
"Bosworth  proposes  to  interpret  the  conjunction  of  rising 
capital-output  ratio  and  falling  rate  of  return  as  a more  or 
less  classical  deepening  of  capital.  The  puzzle  resides  in 
the  fact  that  the  capital-labor  ratio  was  almost  flat  in  the 
second  half  of  the  the  1970s  and  probably  did  not  rise  much 
between  1967  and  1980.  If  there  is  any  technological 
progress  at  all,  a constant  capital-labor  ratio  would  imply 
a  falling  capital-output  ratio,  so  I take  it  that  even  a 
small  rise  in  the  capital-labor  ratio  would  be  hard  to 
reconcile  with  the  perceptible  rise  in  the  capital-output 
ratio"  (Solow,  in  Bosworth  1982,  p.  320). 
The  rise  in  the  capital-output  ratio  is  clearly  discernible 
in  the  fifth  row  of  Table  10 and  its  correspondence  with  a period 
in  which  the  capital-labor  ratio  was  flat  aligns  with  Solow's 
observation.  In  fact,  the  nonfinancial  corporate  capital-labor 
ratio  grew  about  1.06  per  cent  per  annum  over  the  1971-1980 
period,  while  the  capital-output  ratio  grew  by  about  2.0  per  cent 
per  annum  (about  17  per  cent  in  total)  over  the  same  period. 
50 An  interesting  point  is  that  the  shares  of  net  investment 
and  after-tax  operating  surplus  in  net  domestic  product  (rows  2 
and  6)  align  closely  from  1948  to  1980.  Both  bulge  in  the  1960s 
(the  arbitrary  breakpoint  at  1965  does  a  poor  job  of  capturing 
the  rise  in  investment  which  began  only  after  1963).  Both  settle 
down  in  the  1970s  to  levels  fairly  close  to  their  1950s  averages. 
I  return  to  this  point  below. 
, 
Declining  capital  productivity.  The  association  between  a 
rising  capital-output  ratio  and  a  period  of  declining 
profitability  points  to  Marx's  Gesetz  des  tendenziellen  Falls  der 
Profitrate.  Stated  in  the  language  of  modern  macroeconomics, 
Marx's  Law  might  be  described  as  an  historical  tendency  for 
capital  accumulation  to  generate  capital-using  technological 
innovation,  which  drives  up  the  capital-output  ratio  and,  unless 
neutralized  by  what  Marx  calls  a  "countervailing  tendency", 
drives  down  the  rate  of  profit. 
Marx  maintains  that  individual  firms  expand  by  investing  in 
techniques  which  give  them  a  cost  advantage  over  their  rivals  and 
raise  their  private  rate  of  return.  As  these  techniques  fan  out 
through  the  the  economy,  they  bring  down  the  social  rate  of 
return  as  an  unintended  consequence  of  their  use.  The  rate  of 
profit  declines  because  of  firm  myopia.37  Why  don't  firms  see 
the  error  of  their  ways  and  avoid  such  behavior?  One  might 
speculate  that  competition  places  firms  in  a  kind  of  Prisoner's 
Dilemma  writ  large.  Even  if  all  the  firms  in  an  industry  know 
that  investment  in  the  latest  technology  will  reduce  the  industry 
51 rate  of  return  if  it  becomes  generalized,  the  payoff  from  having 
a  monopoly  on  that  technology  and  the  potential  loss  from  being 
beaten  to  the  punch  by  rivals  encourages  "defection"  rather  than 
"cooperation". 
Marx's  prediction  has  generated  intense  criticism,  most  of 
it  from  Marxian  economists  themselves.38  His  own  account 
provides  the  raw  material  for  its  critique,  for  Marx  listed  a 
series  of  potential  "countervailing  tendencies"  which  would 
suppress  the  decline  in  profitability,  Critics  argue  that  under 
normal  circumstances,  the  countertendencies  prevail.  Okishio 
(1961)  proves  that  if  (1)  real  wages  are  constant  and  (2)  firms 
adopt  new  techniques  which  lower  unit  costs  at  existing  prices  in 
a  circulating  capital  model,  then  the  new  equilibrium  profit  rate 
established  after  new  techniques  are  fully  propagated  will  exceed 
the  old  rate.  Despite  a  myopic  decision  rule,  the  rate  of  return 
exhibits  a  rising  tendency  unless  inhibited  by  other  factors, 
such  as  a  wage-push  profit  squeeze. 
It  is  now  recognized  that  the  Okishio  Theorem  can  be  turned 
around  to  support  the  original  unintended  consequences  argument 
under  several  conditions.  If  it  is  assumed  that  real  wages  rise 
at  the  same  rate  as  productivity  (constant  wage  share),  then 
firms  which  follow  the  decision  rule  (2)  above  will  wind  up 
lowering  the  social  rate  of  return;  Foley  (1986A,  pp.  45-47) 
provides  a  simple  illustration.  Further,  in  models  with  fixed 
capital  (Shaikh  1978)  or  joint  production  (Salvadori  1981),  the 
possibility  of  decision  rules  which  lead  to  a  decline  in 
52 profitability  has  been  demonstrated. 
The  distributional  conditions  for  the  Okishio  Theorem 
(constant  real  wage)  or  the  Anti-Okishio  Theorem  (real  wage 
growth  equal  productivity  growth)  are  extremes,  and  actual 
economies  fall  somewhere  in  between.3g  "Thus,"  writes  Foley 
(1986A,  p.  47),  "the  real  economies  fall  into  the  class  of  cases 
> 
where  the  movement  of  the  rate  of  profit  cannot  be  predicted  on  a_ 
priori  theoretical  grounds." 
It  will  be  useful  to  examine  some  empirical  evidence  bearing 
on  the  Marxian  hypothesis.  Figure  3  shows  the  ratio  of  net  fixed 
capital  stock  to  net  domestic  product  of  nonfinancial  corporate 
sector,  and  the  same  ratio  multiplied  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board's  capacity  utilization  rate  for  manufacturing  as  a  (rough) 
way  of  measuring  the  ratio  of  capital  to  potential  output.  The 
point  is  that  both  series  hint  at  a  rising  trend.40  The  capital- 
output  ratio  declined  in  the  196Os,  but  after  about  1966  it  has 
been  rising.  It  seems  likely  that  extending  the  Weisskopf  study 
(see  previous  section)  to  the  1980s  would  generate  results  more 
in  alignment  with  those  of  Bayer  and  Funke  in  Table  6. 
Table  11  reproduces  the  data  on  the  manufacturing  sectors  of 
eleven  countries  from  Chan-Lee  and  Sutch  (1985A).  The  first 
column  shows  the  full-period  growth  rate  in  the  nominal  output- 
capital  ratio.41  From  here  out,  I  switch  terminology  and  refer 
to  the  output-capital  ratio  (capital  productivity)  rather  than 
its  reciprocal.  The  full  sample  trend  in  capital  productivity  is 
downward  by  this  index  in  every  country  except  Italy,  Belgium, 
53 and  Norway. 
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two  and  three  break  the  changes  in  real  capital 
into  two  sub-periods,  roughly  the  1960s  and  1970s. 
The  pattern  observed  in  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  of  the 
U.S.  is  mirrored  in  the  behavior  of  the  manufacturing  aggregates 
in  row  one  for  the  U.S.,  and  significantly,  this  pattern  is  quite 
general.  In  every  case,  save  Germany  and  Italy,  capital  ’ 
productivity  growth  slowed  in  the  1970s.  Chan-Lee  and  Sutch 
observe  that  the  profit  decline  in  the  late  1960s  to  early  1970s 
was  more  tightly  associated  with  distributional  factors  than  in 
the  later  197Os,  when  "the  primary  factor  .  .  .  appears  to  be 
capital  productivity"  (1985A,  p.  76). 
The  evidence  reviewed  here  is  merely  suggestive  of  the 
overmechanization  or  overaccumulation  effects  under  consideration 
and  alternative  explanations  can  easily  be  fashioned.  For 
example,  the  data  in  Table  11  are  not  cyclically  adjusted,  and 
declining  capital  productivity  could  merely  reflect  lower 
capacity  utilization.  Alternatively,  a  decline  in  the  ratio  of 
value  added  to  capital  could  reflect  the  effect  of  raw  material 
price  increases  in  reducing  the  income  of  importing  countries  or 
sectors.  It  is  also  interesting  that  declining  profitability 
precedes  declining  capital  productivity  (at  least  in  the  U.S.), 
in  apparent  violation  of  the  Marxian  theory. 
The  Marxian  argument  for  a  falling  tendency  in  the  profit 
rate  raises  the  question  of  the  consequences  of  declining 
profitability.  Marx  himself  believed  he  had  uncovered  a  tendency 
54 toward  general  economic  crisis-- sharp  periods  of  reduced  economic 
activity.  A  gradual  decline  in  the  rate  of  profit,  however,  need 
not  imply  such  dramatic  discontinuities  in  economic  growth.  "If 
the  rate  of  profit  were  indeed  falling  consistently,"  writes 
Foley  (1986B,  p.  153),  "why  would  the  capitalist  system  not  adapt 
to  this  fall  through  a  gradual  reduction  in  the  rate  of 
accumulation?" 
. 
Marx  himself  probably  reasoned  that  a  decline  in 
profitability  would  ultimately  result  in  a  stagnation  of  the  mass 
of  profits,  leading  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  capital  outlays,  and 
an  oral  tradition  of  explaining  recent  macroeconomic  history  in 
this  way  exists.  On  a  ratio  scale  to  ease  growth  comparisons, 
Figure  4  shows  real  fixed  net  investment  and  the  deflated  after- 
tax  operating  surplus  of  nonfinancial  corporations.  The 
impression  that  the  1970s  was  a  period  of  normalcy  is  called  into 
question  by  these  data.  In  real  terms,  net  investment  went  flat 
after  1966.  From  1966  to  the  peak  in  1979  it  grew  at  an  annual 
rate  of  1.2  per  cent,  compared  to  4.1  per  cent  from  1948  to  1966. 
The  mass  of  real  profits  stagnated  in  the  same  way,  growing  at 
an  annual  rate  of  4.9  per  cent  from  1948  to  1966  and  only  1.4 
per  cent  from  1966  to  the  peak  in  1978.  From  this  perspective, 
the  stagnation  of  the  last  two  decades  follows  from  the  limits 
imposed  on  capital  accumulation  by  the  availability  of  profits. 
Taxes  and  profitability,  The  final  issue  I discuss  is 
corporate  taxation.  The  neo-Keynesian  theory  of  distribution 
developed  by  Kalecki,  Kaldor,  Robinson,  Pasinetti  and  others 
55 posits  a  causal  role  for  investment  demand  in  shaping  the 
functional  distribution  of  income.  This  theory  is  conveniently 
addressed  in  a  discussion  of  tax  incidence. 
Three  complicating  factors  in  the  taxation  of  corporate 
income  are  the  tax  treatment  of  interest,  inflation,  and  the  tax 
codes.  Because  interest  is  exempt  from  the  corporate  income  tax, 
increases  in  the  interest  share  of  operating  surplus  will*lower 
the  effective  tax  rate  on  capital  income.  It  is  customary  to 
assume  that  firms  finance  themselves  with  an  optimal  mix  of  debt 
and  equity  that  maximizes  the  benefits  of  the  tax  shield  in  the 
interests  of  shareholders,  The  secular  increase  in  debt- 
financing  has  contributed  to  a  decline  in  effective  tax  rates.12 
Inflation  increases  effective  tax  rates  (see  the  discussion  of 
IVA  in  the  first  section).  Effective  statutory  rates  have  been 
repeatedly  reduced  over  the  last  three  decades,  mainly  through 
the  vehicle  of  liberalized  depreciation  or  investment  tax 
credits. 
In  combination  these  three  factors  created  a  downward  trend 
in  the  effective  tax  rate  on  net  operating  surplus  until  around 
1967,  and  a  plateau  through  the  1970s.  Figure  5  shows  the 
effective  tax  rate  on  operating  surplus  and  on  corporate  economic 
profits.  The  tax  rates  on  total  capital  income  estimated  by 
Feldstein  et.  al.  (1983)  include  state  and  local  corporate  taxes, 
as  well  as  the  taxes  on  dividends,  capital  gains  and  interest 
paid  by  the  shareholders  and  creditors  of  nonfinancial 
corporations.  This  more  comprehensive  rate  actually  rose  in  the 
56 1970s  to  1950s  levels. 
The  economic  incidence  of  corporate  income  taxes  remains  a 
vexing  issue.  Opinions  vary  from  no  shifting  to  full  shifting; 
an  informal  oral  poll  convinces  me  that  many  probably  settle  for 
the  golden  mean  --  fifty  per  cent  shifting.  Empirical  evidence 
of  short-run  shifting  runs  from  none  (R.  Gordon  1967)  to  full 
(Krzyzanick  and  Musgrave  1964). 
. 
In  short-run  models  of  partial  equilibrium,  it  is  hard  to 
imagine  how  firms  could  shift  any  of  the  corporate  income  tax. 
If  they  are  maximizing  profit  before  the  tax  is  imposed,  they 
will  continue  to  maximize  after-tax  profit  at  the  same 
combination  of  price  and  output  after  the  tax  is  imposed.  By 
treating  corporate  taxes  as  direct  taxes,  the  national  income 
accounts  align  closely  with  the  short-run  model  in  which 
shareholders  bear  the  entire  burden  of  profit  taxes. 
Given  that  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  accounts  for 
about  two-thirds  of  privately  produced  output  in  the  U.S.,  a 
partial  equilibrium  analysis  is  probably  not  appropriate,  and 
several  general  equilibrium  or  macroeconomic  models  have  been 
proposed  to  tackle  the  incidence  problem.  In  neoclassical 
models  following  Harberger  (1962)  corporate  capital  avoids  some 
of  the  tax  by  shifting  to  the  noncorporate  sector,  but  capital 
income  (regardless  of  legal  form)  still  bears  some  of  the  burden 
of  taxation,  how  much  depending  on  the  parameters  of  the  model. 
A  short-period  theory  of  incidence  in  the  Keynesian 
tradition  arrives  at  the  full  shifting  conclusion  by  virtue  of 
57 its  distinctive  Keynesian  treatment  of  investment.  In 
Asimakopolous  and  Burbidge  (1974),  investment  is  assumed 
exogenous  in  real  terms.  By  further  assuming  that  all  saving  is 
out  of  mark-up  income  (either  retained  earnings  or  saving  by 
rentiers),  and  (for  comparison  with  the  neoclassical  result) 
that  full  employment  is  maintained,  they  show  that  an  increase 
in  the  corporate  profit  tax  which  finances  a  balanced  budget 
increase  in  government  spending  is  entirely  born  by  lower 
after-tax  real  wages. 
The  mechanism  illustrates  very  nicely  the  logical  structure 
of  neo-Keynesian  theory.  Under  the  investment  and  saving 
assumptions  mentioned,  after-tax  profits  are  equal  to  the  sum  of 
rentier  consumption,  investment,  the  trade  surplus  and  the 
government  deficit  following  Kalecki's  (1971,  pp.  78-93)  profit 
identity;  also  see  Keynes's  famous  "widow's  cruse"  discussion 
(1930,  p.  139).  Assume  a  closed  economy  to  get  rid  of  current 
account  issues.  Firms  set  prices  in  equilibrium  by  marking  up 
unit  costs;  the  mark-up  must  be  consistent  with  the  profit 
identity  at  the  equilibrium  levels  of  its  variables.  A  corporate 
profit  tax  together  with  a  rise  in  government  spending  creates 
an  excess  demand  for  saving.  Under  the  assumption  of  full 
employment  output,  firms  raise  their  mark-ups  until  enough 
saving  is  generated  to  eliminate  the  excess  demand.  The  entire 
burden  of  the  tax  falls  on  workers,  whose  money  wages  are  assumed 
to  remain  constant  while  the  price  level  rises.  In  case  of 
underemployment  equilibrium,  excess  demand  for  saving  can  also  be 
58 eliminated  by  an  increase  in output. 
This  model  is  similar  to  the  long-run  growth  model  of  Kaldor 
(19561.  Kaldor  assumes  the  rate  of  investment  is  exogenously 
given  at  a  level  which  continuously  maintains  the  full  employment 
of  a  growing  labor  force.43  A  corporate  profit  tax  will  fall 
entirely  on  wages  since  the  after-tas  share  of  profits  is 
determined  by  the  exogenously  determined  level  of  investment  and 
output,  and  the  savings  propensities  out  of  wages  and  profits.44 
Kaldor  recognizes  the  possibility  that  real  wages  are  not 
sufficiently  flexible  to  permit  exogenous  investment  spending  to 
determine  the  distribution  of  income,  in  which  case,  he  observes, 
we  are  back  in  a  Ricardo-Marx  world.  In  this  world,  investment 
is  limited  by  the  available  saving  out  of  profits,  and  not  the 
other  way  around.  Taxes  are  borne  by  capital  income  because 
workers  are  capable  of  resisting  reductions  in  their  real  wage. 
This  modification  of  the  Keynesian  model  represents  a  tradition 
that  runs  through  Joan  Robinson's  "inflation  barrier"  straight  to 
the  Marx-Keynes  synthetic  models  of  Marglin  and  Taylor.  In 
Marglin's  hybrid  model,  for  exampleJ  tax  incidence  ultimately  is 
determined  in  a  bargaining  setting;  see  the  discussion  in  Marglin 
(1984B,  pp.  138-40). 
Neoclassical  growth  models  focus  on  the  balanced  budget 
effects  of  corporate  taxes  on  the  accumulation  of  capital.  By 
raising  the  rental  cost  of  capital,  a  tax  on  capital  reduces  the 
equilibrium  level  of  capital  per  efficiency  unit  of  labor.  Under 
diminishing  returnsJ  the  before-tax  rate  of  profit  rises. 
59 Whether  it  rises  enough  to  neutralize  the  effects  of  the  tax 
depends.  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980,  pp.  238-39)  show  that  in 
the  case  of  an  extreme  classical  saving  function  (no  saving  out 
of  wages),  the  after-tax  rate  of  return  remains  constant,  just  as 
it  might  in  Kaldor's  model.  In  a  more  general  case,  in  which 
the  saving  propensity  out  of  profits  exceeds  that  out  of  wages, 
the  degree  of  shifting  depends  on  the  parameters  of  the  mode1.45 
The  long-run  neoclassical  growth  model  suggests  that  a  tax 
reduction  stimulates  greater  capital  intensity  and  lowers  the 
before-tax  rate  of  profit.  Tax  rates  and  the  before-tax  rate  of 
return  move  in  the  same  direction  while  tax  rates  and  the  after- 
tax  rate  of  profit  move  in  opposite  directions.  The  Kaldorian- 
type  model  suggests  the  same  pattern  between  taxes  and  the 
before-tax  rate  of  profit,  as  firms  increase  their  mark-ups 
whenever  the  tax  rate  is  increased  and  vice  versa. 
Over  the  long  haul,  as  effective  tax  rates  have  fallen,  so 
has  the  before-tax  rate  of  return,  while  the  after-tax  rate  of 
return  has  exhibited  no  clear  trend,  Moreover,  the  timing  has 
been  awkward  from  the  perspective  of  a  simple  application  of  the 
neoclassical  model.  As  Feldstein  et.  al.  (1983,  p.  154)  observe, 
there  "appears  to  have  been  no  tendency  for  pretax  profits  to 
vary  in  a  way  that  offsets  differences  in  effective  tax  rates." 
(The  tax  rate  under  consideration  is  that  on  total  capital 
income,  which  would  be  indicated  by  neoclassical  theory.) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  neo-Keynesian  theory  of  distribution 
essentially  predicts  that  changes  in  the  after-tax  share  of 
60 capital  income  should  follow  movements  in  the  share  of  investment 
spending;  with  full  shifting,  what  happens  to  before-tax  profits 
is  irrelevant.  Table  10  shows  that  the  after-tax  net  operating 
surplus  and  net  fixed  investment  (as  shares  of  nonfinancial 
corporate  net  domestic  product)  correspond  loosely  in  their 
movements.  The  obvious  exception,  the  1980's,  makes  sense  from 
the  perspective  of  Kalecki's  profit  identity  because  budget 
deficits  remained  larger  than  the  current  account  deficit  until 
about  1986.  A  bulge  in  profitability  in  the  1960s  aligns  with  a 
bulge  of  similar  magnitude  in  net  investment,  although  this 
correlation  does  little  to  establish  causation,  and  it  is 
significant  that  profitability  increased  before  net  investment. 
In  the  Ricardo-Marx  tradition,  and  in  the  Keynes-Marx  hybrid 
models,  profit  tax  shifting  is  less  than  complete;  the  before-tax 
rate  of  profit  is  not  irrelevant.  Could  declines  in  the  before- 
tax  rate  of  profit  have  been  cushioned  by  the  political  influence 
of  business  in  the  U.S.  in  convincing  Congress  (with  appeals  to 
the  the  national  saving  rate)  to  lower  effective  tax  burdens?  In 
one  short-period  model  of  Asimakopolous  and  Burbidge  (1974,  Table 
IIa,  case  i),  shifting  from  corporate  taxes  to  wage  taxes  to 
finance  the  same  level  of  government  spending  reduces  the  level 
of  aggregate  demand  for  any  given  level  of  investment.  It  would 
be  interesting  to  know  what  the  properties  of  a  similar  move 
might  be  in  a more  dynamic  setting  (e.g.  with  an  investment 
function),  and  particularly  what  the  net  effect  on  investment 
would  be. 
61 Concluding  thoughts.  Rather  than  attempt  a  summary,  I offer 
an  observation.  In  the  heyday  of  growth  theory,  Kaldor 
challenged  us  to  explain  the  "stylized  facts"  of  long-run  growth: 
rising  ratios  of  capital  and  output  to  labor,  constant  ratios  of 
output  and  profits  to  capital.  The  evidence  under  review  here 
challenges  us  to  explain  some  stylization-resistant  facts  of 
medium-run  growth  (and  stagnation)  involving  the  same  ratios. 
Decline  at  an  uneven  rate,  rather  than  constancy,  has 
characterized  the  before-tax  rate  of  profit  over  the  post-war 
period  in  the  U.S.  and  other  industrial  countries.  These 
declines  have  been  associated  with  smaller  profit  shares  and,  in 
later  years,  often  with  lower  output-capital  ratios.  The  after- 
tax  rate  of  return  has  shown  no  long-run  trend  in  the  U.S.,  and 
has  declined  less  sharply  than  the  before-tax  rate  in most  other 
industrial  countries.  In  the  U.S.,  there  is  a noticeable  bulge 
in  both  profit  rates  in  the  1960s.  From  the  variety  of 
explanations  of  these  patterns  offered  by  representatives  of 
different  schools  of  thought,  and  from  the  divergent  significance 
attached  to  these  facts  by  alternative  theories,  it  is  clear  that 
macroeconomic  profitability  offers  a  rich  and  important  field  for 
theoretical  and  practical  investigation. 
62 ENDNOTES 
1.  For  recent  works  which  compare  the  logical  structures  of 
these  three  competing  paradigms,  consult  Harris  (1978)  and 
Marglin  (1984A).  Recent  contributions  by  neoclassical  economists 
which  elucidate  the  role  of  profitability  are  Malinvaud  (1980, 
1982)  and  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985).  Contributions  that  synthesize 
elements  of  Marxian  and  Keynesian  theory  are  Taylor  (1985)  and 
Marglin  (1984A,  1984B).  For  somewhat  more  Keynesian  views  of  the 
same  issues,  see  Nell  (1985)  or  Dutt  (1984).  Aspects  of  the 
Marxian  theory  of  economic  growth  appear  in  growth  cycle  models 
in  the  tradition  of  Kalecki  (1971)  or  Goodwin  ('1967).  Foley 
(1987)  is  a  recent  development. 
2.  For  additional  discussion  of  accrued  versus  realized  holding 
gains,  and  alternative  income  concepts,  see  Shoven  and  Bulow 
(1975,  1976).  For  discussion  of  the  state  of  the  art  among 
practicing  accountants,  see  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board 
(1984,  Statement  #33). 
3.  Financial  accounts  treat  future  expenditures  associated  with 
plant  closures,  company  reorganizations,  and  the  like  as  current 
expenses,  while  the  NIPAs  recognize  them  as  expenses  only  when 
made.  This  difference  can  lead  to  discrepancies  between  reported 
and  NIPA  profits;  see  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis  (1985A,  Appendix  A).  I  am  indebted  to  Kenneth 
Petrick  of  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  for  calling  this  to  my 
attention. 
4.  King  and  Fullerton  (1984,  pp.  204-214)  provide  a  summary  of 
changes  in  the  tax  codes.  Other  chapters  describe  the  prevalence 
of  such  liberalization  of  depreciation  schedules  in  other 
industrial  countries. 
5.  For  the  methodology  used  in  calculating  the  IVA,  see  U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1976,  pp. 
135-38)  or  see  Ruggles  and  Ruggles  (1956,  pp.  180-181). 
6.  Shoven  and  Bulow  use  constant  dollar  accounting  to  capture 
gains  on  fixed  capital  and  constant  dollar  FIFO  for  inventory 
gains.  They  also  include  accrued  holding  gains  from  changes  in 
the  market  value  of  net  financial  liabilities,  which  I  have 
ignored. 
7.  I  ignore  imputed  interest  payments  out  of  sympathy  for  the 
Ricardo-Marx  tradition.  Imputing  interest  suppresses  the 
redistribution  of  surplus  value  from  productive  enterprises, 
where  it  originates,  to  financial  enterprises.  Pollin  (1986) 
treats  imputed  interest  in  the  same  way  as  I  but  also  deducts  the 
inflation  premium  from  net  interest  on  the  grounds  that  it  is 
really  a  repayment  of  principal. 
63 8.  For  some  discussion  of  the  methodology  of  estimating  capital 
stocks  and  the  evidence  about  actual  patterns  of  their  decay, 
consult  U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
(1983,  Appendix  C)  or  Young  and  Musgrave  (1980,  pp.  32-36). 
9.  The  reader  may  wish  to  consult  the  June  1984  American 
Economic  Review  for  the  lively  controversy  Fisher  and  McGowen 
stimulated. 
10.  Replacing  the  assumption  of  balanced  sets  of  projects  with 
one  of  constant  exponential  growth  improves  the  accuracy  of 
accounting  rates  under  some  conditions.  If  the  growth  rate 
equals  the  internal  rate,  both  gross  and  net  accounting  rates 
will  too.  For  an  accountant,  living  is  easy  on  a  Von  Neumann 
growth  path. 
11.  The  simplest  way  to  adjust  for  the  cycle  is  to  calculate  the 
rate  of  profit  on  capital  stock  actually  in  use.  The  growth 
accounting  framework  developed  by  Weisskopf  and  discussed  below 
effectively  proceeds  in  this  way. 
12.  Studies  not  included  in  Table  3  are  Corcoran  (1977),  Runyon 
(1979),  Schultze  (1975),  and  Okun  and  Perry  (1970).  Scanlon 
(1981)  provides  an  overview  of  the  1970s  literature. 
13.  For  an  introduction,  consult  Coutts  et  al.  (1978),  Nordhaus 
and  Godley  (1972),  and  Sylos-Labini  (1979A). 
14.  Okun  (1981)  provides  an  influential  rationalization  for 
price  stickiness:  customer  markets.  It  is  now  clear  that  price 
rigidity  (non-clearing  markets)  is  perhaps  the  major  divide 
between  New  Classical  economists  and  the  mainstream.  Neo- 
Keynesians  seem  split  over  how  much  autonomy  firms  have  in  their 
pricing  policy. 
15.  See  Fay  and  Medoff  (1985)  for  an  introduction  to  the  paradox 
of  short  run  increasing  returns  to  labor.  It  is  paradoxical 
because  it  contradicts  a  simple  diminishing  returns  theory  of  the 
firm. 
16.  This  equation  applies  to  the  short  run,  so  capital  stock  is 
fixed.  With  a  constant  mark-up,  the  real  wage  (w/p)  is  also 
fixed  in  this  simple  model.  Thus, 
w(l+m)Ln  -  at 
bl=  ------------_-----  >  0 
PK 
17.  Like  all  conveniences,  this  one  breaks  down.  Feldstein  and 
Summers  (1977)  express  some  concern  about  the  large  value  of 
their  trend  term  without  the  cyclical  controls,  even  though  it  is 
nonsignificant. 
64 18.  Runyon  (1979)  similarly  argues  that  the  bulge  of  the  1960s 
is  more  puzzling  than  the  slump  of  the  1970s.  An  extraordinary 
feature  of  the  1960s  was  the  exceptionally  high  level  of 
investment,  which  serves  to  realize  profits  through  a well-known 
Kaleckian  mechanism.  I return  to  this  theme  below. 
19.  In  Weisskopf,  the  latter  two  are  called  the  realization 
failure  and  rising  organic  composition  of  capital  hypotheses, 
following  established  Marxian  categories. 
20.  Feldstein  et  al.  (1983)  experiment  with  richer  cyclical 
controls  to  capture  the  asymmetry.  . 
21.  Munley  (1981)  takes  exception  to  the  idea  that  the  declining 
profit  share  in  phase  B  results  from  worker  strength,  observing 
tha-1;  real  wages  actually  grow  more  rapidly  (by  a  factor  of  from 
1.2  to  2.8)  during  phase  A.  See  also  Weisskopf's  (1981) 
rejoinder.  Another  hypothesis  that  might  explain  the  phase  B 
profit  squeeze  is  that  raw  material  prices  shoot  up  in  this 
period,  as  suggested  by  Kalecki  (1971,  pp.  62-64).  This 
hypothesis  could  be  studied  using  the  mark-up  pricing  method 
described  in  the  text. 
22.  In  neoclassical  theory,  the  rental  cost  of  capital  reduces 
to  three  components:  the  relative  price  of  one  unit  of  capital, 
the  tax  liability  of  using  it,  and  the  after-tax  opportunity  cost 
of  funding  it.  I adopt  the  convention  of  calling  the  latter 
component  the  cost  of  funds. 
23.  Both  arguments  predict  a decline  in  the  rate  of  profit  but 
obviously  can  only  explain  a drop  in  the  share  of  profit  on 
condition  that  the  elasticity  of  substitution  is  less  than  unity. 
See  Nordhaus  (1974,  pp.  195-196). 
24.  Taxes,  inflation,  oligopoly,  and  intangible  assets  can  drive 
q  away  from  unity,  and  there  is  also  the  problem  that  q-theory 
indicates  the  use  of  marginal  q while  researchers  utilize  average 
q*  See  Summers  (1981)  or  Von  Furstenberg  (1977).  Abel  and 
Blanchard  (1986)  is  a  rare  use  of  marginal  q. 
25.  For  additional  comparisons  of  q-ratios,  see  Brainard  et  al. 
(I980),  also  a  good  entry  point  to  the  literature  on  why  markets 
seem  to  have  undervalued  firms  in  the  1970s.  Also  recommended: 
Modigliani  and  Cohn  (1979)  and  Kopke  (1982). 
26.  This  same  line  of  reasoning  applies  to  a  closed  economy. 
Shepherd  (1982)  maintains  that  the  share  of  U.S.  national  income 
produced  under  effectively  competitive  conditions  has  increased 
from  56  to  77  percent  from  1958  to  1980.  Import  penetration  is 
one  of  three  explanatory  factors. 
65 27.  This  seminal  work  in  the  neo-Marxian  profit  squeeze 
tradition  was  followed  by  a  more  cyclical  version,  Boddy  and 
Crotty  (1975). 
28.  One  difference  is  that  Bowles  et  al.  (1986,  p.  155)  deny 
that  profitability  rose  substantially  in  the  198Os,  while  Clark 
finds  an  increase  in  the  cyclically  adjusted  profit  share  in  this 
period. 
29.  Let  A  represent  the  technology  matrix  of  a  circulating 
capital  economy,  1  the  vector  of  direct  labor  requirements,  w  the 
money  wage,  and  r  the  equilibrium  rate  of  profit.  The  _ 
equilibrium  price  vector,  p,  satisfies  I 
P  =  (l+r)pA  +  wl 
and  r  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  dominant  eigenvalue  of  the  matrix 
(I-A)-'.  Wolff  incorporates  fixed  capital,  but  the  procedure  is 
basically  the  same. 
30.  This  interpretation  of  the  movement  along  row  1  as  a  pure 
effect  of  technical  change  is  my  own.  In  a  footnote,  Wolff  (p. 
108,  n.  25)  observes  that  if  the  composition  of  real  consumption 
changes  while  its  level  remains  constant,  the  rate  of  profit 
rises  along  row  1. 
31.  The  existence  of  a  strictly  convex  factor  price  frontier  was 
the  object  of  the  Cambridge  capital  controversy;  see  Harcourt 
(1972).  It  appears  that  rumors  of  the  death  of  the  aggregate 
production  function  were  exaggerated.  Neoclassical  economists 
continue  to  use  it,  fully  aware  of  serious  methodological 
problems,  probably  because  it  provides  a  tractable  analytic 
framework  and  a  good  econometric  fit. 
32.  Malinvaud  (1977)  assumes  "putty-clay"  technology,  but  with 
different  vintages  of  clay  extant,  product  wages  will  be  too  high 
to  use  the  least  efficient  machines,  and  classical  unemployment 
breaks  out. 
33.  To  be  precise,  they  estimate: 
r  =  a0  t  alxt  -  aiw  -  a2pn  t  a3j 
with  r,  w,  pn,  and  j  the  rate  of  profit,  product  wage  in  gross 
output  units,  relative  price  of  raw  materials,  and  capacity 
utilization  (all  in  logarithms),  x  is  the  rate  of  Harrod  neutral 
technological  progress,  and  t  is  time. 
66 34.  In  the  second  OPEC  shock,  they  argue  that  the  saving 
function  shifted  down  by  more  than  the  investment  function, 
driving  interest  rates  up.  Note  that  temporary  price  shocks  will 
not  reduce  investment  today  since  firms  equate  the  marginal 
product  of  future  capital  stocks  with  the  rental  of  capital. 
35.  The  Cambridge  growth  equation  is  g=spr  where  g  is  the  rate 
of  capital  accumulation  and  s  p is  the  saving  rate  out  of  profits. 
See  Pasinetti  (1974,  Chs.  5-6),  Marglin  (1984A),  or  Robinson 
(1964,  pp.  48-49). 
36.  Besides  the  low  cost  of  funds  hypothesis,  another 
explanation  based  on  capital  deepening  is  that  of  slower  neutral 
technical  progress.  With  slower  Harrod-neutral  technical 
progress,  capital  becomes  more  abundant  relative  to  labor 
measured  in  efficiency  units.  Feldstein  et  al.  (1983,  p.  151) 
add  productivity  growth  to  their  profit  rate  equation  on  these 
grounds,  I believe. 
37.  Leontief  (1985)  has  a myopic  firm  hypothesis  that  is  a 
photographic  negative  of  Marx's,  To  wit,  firms  do  not  recognize 
that  a  new  technology  when  fully  propagated  will  increase  the 
social  rate  of  return  because  they  can  only  assess  its  affects  on 
their  profitability.  The  parallels  between  Marx  and  Schumpeter 
(sans  the  falling  profit  tendency)  on  profits  and  technical 
dynamism  should  also  be  noted. 
38.  See  Van  Parijs  (1980)  and  references  therein. 
39.  Unlike  neoclassical  economists,  Marxian  economists  retain 
the  Classical  distinction  between  productive  and  unproductive 
labor,  and  define  productivity  over  the  former.  Thus,  a  constant 
wage  share  (including  unproductive  workers)  is  consistent  with 
productivity  growth  in  excess  of  real  wage  growth.  The  rate  of 
surplus  value  then  rises;  see  Moseley  (1985). 
40.  I regressed  the  raw  and  adjusted  capital-output  ratios  on 
time.  The  coefficients  and  t-statistics  are:  0.005  (2.77)  and 
0.002  (1.40). 
41.  Since  GOS/KG  =  (Gos/vA)(vA/KG),  the  growth  rate  of  VA/KG 
equals  the  growth  rate  of  GOS/KG  minus  that  of  GOS/VA. 
42.  I plead  guilty  to  inattention  to  the  link  between 
profitability  and  finance,  particularly  the  implications  of 
rising  corporate  indebtedness.  The  work  of  Minsky  (see  Minsky 
1986  and  references  therein)  has  been  influential  in  this  regard. 
Also  see  Pollin  (1986). 
67 43.  Neo-Keynesian  theory  relies  critically  on  "investor 
sovereignty",  viz.  that  investment  is  exogenous  (in  some  sense) 
because  firms  have  superior  access  to  finance  (see  Marglin  1984A, 
P*  322).  This  view  comes  under  attack  in Asimakopolous  (1983). 
44.  Indeed,  Kaldor  concludes  that  "the  incidence  of  all  taxes  . 
.  .  falls  on  wages"(1956,  p.  96).  Recent  work  by  Marrelli  and 
Salvadori  (1983)  with  a more  general  saving  function  shows  that 
full  shifting  is  probably  a  special  case. 
45.  This  marriage  of  Keynesian  and  neoclassical  elements-is  & 
rigeur  in  growth  theory  and  its  applications.  Atkinson  and 
Stiglitz  assume  a well-behaved  neoclassical  production  function. 
Marrelli  and  Salvadori  (1983)  allow  for  a more  general 
technological  relationship  between  the  rate  of  profit  and  capital 
output  ratio. 
68 Table  1.  Comparisons  of  Revised  and  Old  NIPA  Series  on  Corporate 
Profits,  U.S.,  Selected  Years. 
Annual  Averages  in  Billions  of  Dollars 
Corporate  Profits 
with  IVA  and 
CCAdj 
CCAdj  IVA 
Years  New  Old  New  Old  .  New  Old 
1953-60  44.2  42.2  -1.2  -2.9  -1.0  -1.0 
1961-70  74.7  72.9  4.4  2.9  2.1  2.1 
1971-80  141.4  136.1  -4.8  -7.3  -22.4  -22.4 
1981-84  204.1  214.9  6.9  21.1  -12:7  -12.5 
----------- 
SOURCES:  Old  series:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis  (1985B,  Appendix  II).  New  series:  U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1986A,  Table 
1.14)  and  updates. 
69 Table  2.  Comparisons  of  Revised  and  Old  Series  on  Net  Capital 
Stock  in  Current  Dollars,  U.S.,  Selected  Years. 
Ratio  of  Revised  Series  to  Old  Series 
Sector 
Years 
1948  1969  1973  1977  1981 
Corporate  1.03  1.06  1.06  1.07  1.08 
Nonfinancial  1.02  1.05  1.07  1.08  1.08 
Manufacturing  .89  .95  1.03  1.05  1.04  . 
--_----_------ 
SOURCE:  Gorman  et  al.  (1985). 
70 Table  3.  Studies  of Hacroeconomic  Profitability  in  the  U.S. 
Author  Years  Coverage  Concept 
Lordhaus  (1974)  1949-73  NFC  BT  NO'S 
Feldstein  and  Summersa  19j9-76  NFC  BT  SOS 
(1977)  KM  +  I?r‘V  + L 
BT  GOS 
KG  +  INV  + L 
Love11  (1478)a 
4 
194?1-  F;FC 
15~7111 
BT  NOS 
EF 
AT  .FiOS 
RX 
bopke  (1978)  1953I-  tiFC  AT  NOS 
14761V  IN  +  IN\'  + L 
Liebling  (1980)a 
Grimm  (1982)a 
1950-77  NFC 
1950-79  EiFC 
BT  NOS 
RX  +  INV 
AT  NOS 
ES  +  INV 
BT  NOS 
RN 
AT  NOS 
RN 
Sosworth  (1982)b  1950-80  Nonfarm 
Business 
NFC 
BT  NOS 
KG  +  INV  + L 
Cycle  control  Trend  Finding 
Mark-up  pricing  na  Predicted  NOS  exceeds  actual 
from  1969  to  1973 
PR8 CU 
(or Wharton  CU 
or G?r'P  Gap) 
Simple  trend 
Trend/shift 
1970s  dummy 
Simple  trend 
Trend/shift 
1970  dummy 
Nonsignificant  negative  trend 
Nonsignificant  negative  trend 
honsignificant  negative  shift 
Nonsignificant  negative  trend 
Ronsignificant  positive  trend 
Significant  negative  shift 
GNP  Gap  Trends  u!  bends  Xegative,  negative,  positive 
at  65,  70  trend  segments 
Positive,  negative,  positive 
trend  segments 
BE.4  and  FR% CU  Trends  w/  bends  Positive,  negative 
GS?  Gap  at  65  segments 
Gneaployment  rate 
FRS  CU  Trend/shift 
(or  othersj  62-68  dummy 
Significant  negative  trend 
Significant  positive  shift 
Ronsignificant  positive  trend 
Significant  positive  shift 
FRB  CL! 
2 productivity 
inflation  rate 
Trend/shift 
1970s  4uomp 
Significant  positive  trend 
Significant  negative  shift 
Significant  positive  trend 
.  ’  Significant  negative  shift 
None  Cyclically  adjusted  series 
declines,  67-80 
Cyclically  adjusted  series 
declines,  67-80 Peldstein  et  ale 
(i9S3) 
Allnan  (1953) 
Bolland  and  Flyersa 
(198;) 
Yinderiifer  (1054) 
1953-79  NFC 
1952-81  Business 
HFC 
1947-81  NFC 
i9;2-a2  Business 
BT  NOS  FRI1  cu 
AN  +  1::v  +  L 
BT  IiOS 
KR 
BT  KOS 
KH  +  INY 
BT  NOS 
KN  +  INV  +  L  +  ?I 
AT  NOS 
KN  +  INV 
AT  NOS 
KR  +  INV  +  L  +  ?l 
UT  NOS 
EN  +  1:r:v  +  L 
AT  &‘OS 
KX  +  IXV  +  L 
FRH  CU 
Dummy  for  recovery 
after  trough 
Index  of  quarters 
before  peak 
GRP  Gap 
X  ?.Real  GSP 
inflation  rate 
GSP  cap 
Clark  (196:)  13541-  NFC  BT  NOS  Mark-up  pricing 
13S3IV  NFC  GDP 
Trcndjshift 
197Cs  dummy 
Trendishiit 
1970s  dunsp 
Trend  WI’  bend  at 
73  and  shift 
1470s  dummy 
Simple  trend 
Trrnd/shift 
1470s  dummy 
Trends  v  ’  ‘bends 
at  65  nad  71 
Zonsicni’ican’  .  c 
S:gniiicant 
positive  trend 
negative  shift 
:iousipnifican:  positive  trend 
Significant  ncgativo  shift 
Positive,  positive  segments 
Sioni’i-ant  ne9ative  shift  0  A.-  P 
Significant  neaatire  trend 
Signficant  negative  trend 
:io.nsifznificant  negative  trena 
Slznificant  negative  shift 
:<onsignifi:an:  negative  trend 
2lgnifirant  negative  shift 
:ionsignifican:  positive  trend 
Sonsignif’  icant  ncgltive  shift 
5iFnificant  positive  trend 
!lonsignificant  no;:irive  shift 
Si  gnlficant  pos.it  i  .e, 
negative,  nonsignificant 
positive  seamenrs 
Decline  in  adjusted  share, 
65-70;  Rise  from  Si-83 
X3Ti‘S:  Slanificance  is  defined  at  the  90  per  cent  level  for  two-tailed  test.  Significance  Lor  studies  using  trends-vith-bends 
merr:oj  is  only  reported  where  appropriate  F-statistic  is  provided  for  joint  hypothesis  testing.  See  text  for  additional  detaiis. 
In  column  five,  parentheses  indicate  alternative  measures  which  do  not  give  substantially  different  results  with  respect  to 
significance  of  trends  or  shifts. 
a  Studies  reporting  a  battery  of  results. 
:  Zosworth  uses  a  “modified  gross  stock”  to  more  closely  approximate  a  wealth  concept  of  capital:  see  Bosworth  (1932,  p.  291). 
C  Feldstein,  et  al.  include  state  and  local  taxes,  personal  taxes  on  property  income  originating  in  the  nonfinancial 
corporate  sector,  and  federal  corporate  Income  taxes  in  measuring  before-tax  profit. 
., _ \.  i.l;r:  !i?t  (Nonfinancial  corporate).  ET  (Refore-tax),  AT  (After-tax),  NOS  (!l’et  operating  surplus),  GOS  (Gross  operatins  surplus). 
K!i  (Net  i;xed  capital),  KG  (Gross  fixed  capital),  INV  (Iuventories),  L  (L.:XD),  .“I  (Soninterest  bcdring  rln.lncrsl  assets),  Cl’ 
(capacity  utilization  index),  FRB  (Federal  Reserve  Board),  DEA  (Bureau  of  Economic  hnolysis). Table  4.  Rates  of  Profita  in Manufacturing,  Nine  Countries, 














Austria  Finland  Germany  1 
BT  AT  BT  AT  BT  AT 
11.1  7.4 
8.0  4.8 
5.6  3.2 
5.3  3.7 
5.9  4.2 
11.4  9.1  17.0  - 
11.5  9.8  15.6  3 
11.0  10.0  12.1 
8.7  7.8  11.0 
Sweden  Japan 
BT  AT 
6.2  3.4 
7.2  4.8 
6.7  4.8 
6.1  4.5 
6.6  5.5 
2.2b  1.4b 
United 
Kingdom 
BT  AT 
1951-55 
1956-60  8.7  5.5 
1961-65  7.9  5.8 
1966-70  5.8  4.7 
1971-75  2.4  2.7 
1976-80 
-----_----- 
Per  Cent 
United 
States 
BT  AT  BT  AT 
16.2  12.0 
7.2  3.6 
6.4  2.4 
17.6  7.6 
13.8  6.8 
17.3  9.8 
16.0  9.1 
10.9  6.1 
10.0  5.5 
France 
BT  AT 
9.9  7.4 
10.7  8.4 
10.0  7.4 
Canada 
BT  AT 
15.4  8.2 
11.4  6.6 
11.0  6.1 
12.5  6.7 
11.2  6  . 4 
6.4=  4.3c  9.ld  5.3d 
SOURCE:  Holland  (1984,  Table  l-1). 
NOTES:  a  Before-tax  (BT)  and  after-tax  (AT)  net  operating 
surplus  divided  by  plant_, equipment,  and  inventories. 
b  1976-78 
c  1976-79 














































































 Table  6.  Decomposition  of  Secular  Changes  in  the  Rate  of  Profit: 
Three  Studies. 
Growth  Rates  of  Variables 
Per  Cent  Per  Annum 
Weisskopf  Bayer  Funke 
U.S.  NFC  Austrian  Mfg.  U.K.  Mfg. 
Variable  1949.1-1975.1  1958-1977  1951-1979 
r  -1.2  -5.3  -4.02 
(NOS/VA)  -1.24  -3.5  -2.37 
(VA/VAf)  +0.02  -0.1  -0.18 
(VAf/pK)  +0.02  -1.7  -1.47 
__----__----c------- 
SOURCES:  Weisskopf  (1979,  Table  31,  Bayer  (1984,  Table  ll-8), 
Funke  (1986,  Table  3). 
NOTES:  Bayer's  data  appear  to  contain  an  error  and  have  been 
recalculated.  Funke's  data  are  my  calculations  of  simple 
averages  of  six  cycles  from  Table  3.  See  text  for  description  of 
variables. 
76 Table  7.  Decomposition  of  Average  Changes  in  the  Rate  of  Pr0fi.t 
During  the  B  Phase  of  Cycle:  Three  Studies. 
Growth  Rates  of  Variables 
Per  Cent  Per  Annum 
Weisskopf  Bayer  Funke 
U.S.  NFC  Austrian  Mfg.  U.K.  Mfg. 
Variable  1949.1-1975.1  1958-1977  1951-1979 
r  -10.1  -7.6  -6.4 
(NOS/VA)  -8.8  -6.1  -5.6 
(VA/VAf)  to.5  to.5  t2.3 
(VAf/pK)  -1.8  -2.3  -3.1 
____-_-_______ 
SOURCES:  Weisskopf  (1979,  Table  4),  Bayer  (1984,  Table  ll-8), 
Funke  (1986,  Table  A3). 
NOTES:  Bayer's  data  do  not  add  up  due  to  rounding  error. 
Funke's  data  are  my  calculations  of  averages  for  six  cycles  from 
Table  A3.  See  text  for  explanation  of  variables. 
77 Table  8.  Tobin's  q,  the  Cost  of  Funds,  and  the  Rate  of  Profit 
for  Nonfinancial  Corporations,  U.S.,  Selected  Periods. 
Average  Values 
Years 




Rate  of  Return 
1951-55  . 71  6.47  %  ,  4.54  % 
1956-60  83 
:98 
5.15  4.27 
19til-65  5.74  5.61 
1966-70  .  98  5.80  5.68 
1971-75  . 77  5.93  4.48 
1976-80  60 
: 64 
7.21  4.28 
1981-85  7.42  4.80 
_----------- 
SOURCES:  Board  of  Governors  (1987A),  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1986A,  Tables  1.16  and 
8.8)  and  updates. 
fiOTES:  Tobin's  q  is  the  market  value  of  nonfinancial 
corporations  divided  by  the  replacement  value  of  their  assets. 
Market  value  is  the  sum  of  credit  market  debt  and  the  market 
value  of  equities.  Replacement  value  of  assets  equals  total 
assets  minus  profit  taxes  payable,  trade  debt,  and  foreign  direct 
investment  in  the  U.S.  After-tax  rate  of  return  equals  after-tax 
net  operating  surplus  divided  by  replacement  value  of  assets. 
Implied  discount  rate  equals  after-tax  rate  of  return  divided  by 
9.  See  notes  to  Figure  2  for  net  operating  suplus. 
78 Table  9.  Trends  in  Gross  Profit  Rates,  Eleven  Countries, 
Manufacturing  and  Total  Business  Sector,  1960-82. 
Growth  Rates 










Manufacturing  Total  Business 
Sector 
-2.7  -2.1 
-3.0  -2.0  - 
-2.7  -1.9  * 
-5.3  -1.9 
-2.0  -0.8 
-4.7  -1.4 
-2.8:r  -4.3 
-5.2  -2.8 
Addendum: 
Gross  Operating 
Surplus  Share 
Japan  -1.9  -2.6 
Italy  -1.o*  -0.6* 
Norway  -0.2"  0.3* 
em-_--w--_-e- 
SOURCE:  Chan-Lee  and  Sutch  (1985A,  Tables  3  and  4). 
NOTES:  Trend  rates  estimated  from  In  r  =  a  t  bt.  Asterisk  (*) 
indicates  not  significant  at  the  5  per  cent  level. 
79 Table  10.  Alternative  Measures  of  Nonfinancial  Corporate  Capital 
Formation  and  Profitability,  U.S.,  Selected  Years. 
Years 
1951-55  1956-60  1961-65  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80 
1981-85 
Gross  Investment 
as  a  percentage 
of  NFC  GDP 
Net  Investment 
as  a  percentage 
of  NFC  NDP 
Net  investment 
($82)  as  a 
percentage  of 
net  fixed 
capital  ($82) 
Growth  rate  of 
12.7  13.1  12.4  13.7  13.4  14.7  14.6 
5.0  4.5  4.4  5.9  4  .5  4.8  3.6 
4.2  3.5  3.8  5.1  3.6  3.6  2.7 
ratio  of  net  fixed 
capital  ($82)  to 
hours  0.50  2.28  2.50  0.05  1.09 
Ratio  of  net 
fixed  capital 
to  NFC  NDP  1.69  1.76  1.58  1.56  1.74  1.86  1.87 
After-tax  net 
operating  surplus 
as  a  percentage 
of  NFC  NDP  9.8  10.0  12.2  11.8  10.2  10.4  11.7 
After-tax  net 
rate  of  profit  5.77  5.68  7.70  7.59  5.91  5.57  6.31 
(per  cent) 
-----___---___-------- 
SOURCES:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis 
(1986A,  Tables  1.16  and  8.8)  and  updates,  Board  of  Governors  (1987B), 
CITIBASE,  Musgrave  (1986,  Tables  6  and  8)  and  updates,  U.S.  President 
(1987,  Table  B-3). 
NOTES:  Nonfinancial  corporate  (NFC)  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  is 
the  sum  of  capital  consumption  allowances  with  CCAdj,  indirect  business 
taxes,  compensation  of  employees,  corporate  profits  with  IVA  and  CCAdj, 
and  net  monetary  interest.  Net  domestic  product  (NDP)  is  GDP  minus 
capital  consumption  allowances  with  CCAdj.  Gross  investment  is  Flow  of 
Funds  category  "fixed  investment."  Net  investment  is  fixed  investment 
less  depreciation  charges,  NIPA,  deflated  by  implicit  price  deflator 
for  nonresidential  fixed  investment  to  give  net  investment  in  1982 
constant  dollars.  For  net  operating  surplus  and  net  rate  of  profit, 
see  notes  to  Figure  2. 
80 Table  11.  Capital  Productivity  in  the  Manufacturing  Sector, 
Eleven  Countries,  1960-82. 
Growth  Rates  of  Gross  Output-Capital  Ratio 
Per  cent  per  annum 
Implied 
Full  Period  1960-72  1972-82 
Trend 
(Nominal  Ratio)  (Real  Ratio) 
Country 
U.S.  -1.9  2.4  -2.2 
Japan  -3.0  0.5  0.4 
Germany  -1.3  -1.2  -0.7 
France  -1.1  2.6  -2.3 
U.K.  -2.5  4.8  -2.6 
Italy  1.1  -2.4  0.7 
Canada  -1.4  1.6  -3.8 
Belgium  0.8  4.8  1.1 
Finland  -2.2  5.0  0.4 
Norway  1.0  0.2  -4.0 
Sweden  -2.8  0.1  -3.2 
---e-e-__---_ 
SOURCE:  Chan-Lee  and  Sutch  (1985A,  Tables  3,4,  and  23). 
NOTES:  Growth  rates  in  column  one  have  not  been  estimated 
directly.  They  are  the  difference  between  trend  growth  rates  in 
the  gross  profit  rate  and  the  gross  profit  share  found  by 
regressing  logs  on  time.  Column  one  refers  to  nominal 
output-capital  ratios;  columns  two  and  three  refer  to  real 
output-capital  ratios.  The  earliest  endpoints  in  column  two 
frequently  are  later  than  1960  owing  to  data  availability. 
Consult  notes  to  Chan  Lee  and  Sutch  (Table  23). 
81 Figure  1.  Before-tax  Profit  Rate,  U.S.  Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sector,  1948-85. 
-----1’----1 
Net  Profit  Rate 
Gross  Profit  Rate 
-vt-------  +-----t~-t--~-t--  ----_-_-{__-__._-_-_ 
-  1930  1995  1980  1970  1975  *  1980 
Year 
SOURCES  :  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1986A,  Tables  1.16  and  8,8) 
and  updates;  blusgrave  (1986,  Tables  5  and  6)  and  updates;  Board  of  Governors  (1987A), 
NOTES  :  Gross  (net)  before-tax  rate  of  profit  is  gross  (net)  before-tax  operating  surplus  divided 
by  the  sum of  gross  (net)  fixed  nonresidential  capital  stock,  end-of-year  inventories,  and  end-of- 
year  demand  deposits  and  currency.  Gross  operating  surplus  is  profits  before  tax  with  IV.4  and 
CCAdj  plus  capital  consumption  allowances  with  CCAdj  plus  net  monetary  interest  paid,  Net  operating 
surplus  is  profits  before  tax  with  IVA  and  CCAdj  plus  net  monetary  interest  paid. Figure 2.  After-tax Profit Rate, U.S. Nonfinancial  Corporate Sector, 1948-85. 
Q7--------' 
-1--v------ 
9.0  t 
! 
0.9  t 
0.0 
7.5 
x  7.0  1  6.5 








SOURCES:  See notes to Figure 1. 
NOTES:  Net after-tax rate of profit is the after-tax  net operating surplus  divided by the 
sum of net fixed nonresidential  capital stock, end-of-year  inventories,  and end-of-year 
demand deposits and currency,  Net operating surplus is profits after tax plus IVA and 
CCAdj plus net monetary interest  paid. Figure  3.  Net  Capital-output  Ratios,  U.S.  Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sector,  1938-85 
2  ~(J_.__.__._“’  r--’  ----  -.-  .-..  .-_ _.-  _  ,____~  .I_..  ._“_-‘7_  7  ~__  I _..---  _-I._-‘_________  ..,‘_.._.  3  --I- 
I 
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19fM  1970  1975  19bO  1965 
Year 
SOURCES  :  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1986A,  Tables  1.16  and  8.8) 
and  updates;  thsgrave  (1986,  Table  6)  and  updates;  CITIBASE. 
NOTES  :  Capital-output  ratio  is  net  fixed  nonresidential  capital  stock  in  current  dollars 
divided  by  net  domestic  product  of  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector,  See  notes  to  Tab112 10 
for  net  domestic  product,  Adjusted  capital-output  ratio  is  multiplied  by  the  Federal 



















































































































































































































 Figure  5.  Effective  Tax  Rates  on  Capital  Income,  Various  Definitions,  U.S.  Nonfinancial 
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1946  1946 1950 $962  1954 1956 1996  1960  1962 1964 1966 1966  1970 1972 1974 1976 1970 1960  1962  1964 
Year 
SOURCES  :  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1986A,  Tables  1.16  and  8.8) 
and  updates;  Feldstein,  et.  al.  (1983,  Table  4). 
NOTES  :  Effective  tax  rate  on  profits  is  profits  tax  liability  divided  by  profits  before  tax 
with  IVA  and  CCAdj  .  Effective  tax  rate  on  net  operating  surplus  is  profits  tax  liability 
divided  by  before-tax  net  operating  surplus.  See  notes  to  Figure  1  for  net  operating  surplus. 
For  effective  tax  rate  on  total  capital  income,  consult  Feldstcin,  et  al.  (1983)  or  test. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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